On the Evolution of Market Institutions: The Platform Design Paradox

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Alos-Ferrer, Carlos; Kirchsteiger, Georg; Walzl, Markus
• 署名单位: University of Konstanz; Universite Libre de Bruxelles; Otto Friedrich University Bamberg
• 刊物名称: ECONOMIC JOURNAL
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0013-0133
• DOI: 10.1111/j.1468-0297.2009.02297.x
• 发表日期: 2010
• 页码: 215-243
• 关键词: long-run; stochastic stability; COMPETITION; equilibria; auctions; models; rules

摘要

We study competition among market designers who create new trading platforms, when boundedly rational traders learn to select among them. We ask whether 'Walrasian' platforms, leading to market-clearing trading outcomes, will dominate the market in the long run. If several market designers compete, we find that traders learn to select non-market clearing platforms with prices systematically above the market-clearing level, provided at least one such platform is introduced by a market designer. This in turn leads market designers to introduce non-market clearing platforms. Hence platform competition induces non-competitive market outcomes.