-
作者：Armstrong, Mark; Zhou, Jidong
作者单位：University of Oxford; Yale University
摘要：We study sales techniques which discourage consumer search by making it harder or more expensive to return to buy after a search for alternatives. It is unilaterally profitable for a seller to deter search under mild conditions, but sellers can suffer when all do so. When a seller cannot commit to its policy, it exploits the inference that those consumers who try to buy later have no good alternative, and in many cases the outcome is as if the seller must make an exploding offer. Search deterr...
-
作者：Iskhakov, Fedor; Rust, John; Schjerning, Bertel
作者单位：University of New South Wales Sydney; Georgetown University; University of Copenhagen
摘要：We define a class of dynamic Markovian games, directional dynamic games (DDG), where directionality is represented by a strategy-independent partial order on the state space. We show that many games are DDGs, yet none of the existing algorithms are guaranteed to find any Markov perfect equilibrium (MPE) of these games, much less all of them. We propose a fast and robust generalization of backward induction we call state recursion that operates on a decomposition of the overall DDG into a finit...
-
作者：Kang, Karam
作者单位：Carnegie Mellon University
摘要：In this article, I quantify the extent to which lobbying expenditures by firms affect policy enactment. To achieve this end, I construct a novel dataset containing all federal energy legislation and lobbying activities by the energy sector during the 110th Congress. I then develop and estimate a game-theoretic model where heterogeneous players choose lobbying expenditures to affect the probability that a policy is enacted. I find that the effect of lobbying expenditures on a policy's equilibri...
-
作者：Dustmann, Christian; Glitz, Albrecht; Schoenberg, Uta; Bruecker, Herbert
作者单位：University of London; University College London; Pompeu Fabra University; Barcelona School of Economics; University of London; University College London; Otto Friedrich University Bamberg
摘要：This article derives novel testable implications of referral-based job search networks in which employees provide employers with information about potential new hires that they otherwise would not have. Using comprehensive matched employer-employee data covering the entire workforce in one large metropolitan labour market combined with unique survey data linked to administrative records, we provide evidence that workers earn higher wages and are less inclined to leave their firms if they have ...
-
作者：Garfagnini, Umberto; Strulovici, Bruno
作者单位：University of Surrey; Northwestern University
摘要：How do successive, forward-looking agents experiment with interdependent and endogenous technologies? In this article, trying a radically new technology not only is informative of the value of similar technologies, but also reduces the cost of experimenting with them, in effect expanding the space of affordable technologies. Successful radical experimentation has mixed effects: it improves the immediate outlook for further experimentation but decreases the value and the marginal value of exper...
-
作者：Ishiguro, Shingo
作者单位：University of Osaka
摘要：This article presents a dynamic general equilibrium model to investigate how different contracting modes based on formal and relational enforcements emerge endogenously and are linked dynamically with the process of economic development. Formal contracts are enforced by third-party institutions (courts), whereas relational contracts are self-enforcing agreements without third-party involvement. The novel feature of our model is that it demonstrates the co-evolution of these different enforceme...
-
作者：Alaoui, Larbi; Penta, Antonio
作者单位：Pompeu Fabra University; Barcelona School of Economics; University of Wisconsin System; University of Wisconsin Madison
摘要：We introduce a model of strategic thinking in games of initial response. Unlike standard models of strategic thinking, in this framework the player's depth of reasoning is endogenously determined, and it can be disentangled from his beliefs over his opponent's cognitive bound. In our approach, individuals act as if they follow a cost-benefit analysis. The depth of reasoning is a function of the player's cognitive abilities and his payoffs. The costs are exogenous and represent the game-theoret...
-
作者：Erosa, Andres; Fuster, Luisa; Kambourov, Gueorgui
作者单位：Universidad Carlos III de Madrid; University of Toronto
摘要：We build a heterogeneous agents life cycle model that captures a large number of salient features of individual male labour supply over the life cycle, by education, both along the intensive and extensive margins. The model provides an aggregation theory of individual labour supply, firmly grounded on individual-level micro-evidence, and is used to study the aggregate labour supply responses to changes in the economic environment. We find that the aggregate labour supply elasticity to a transi...
-
作者：Schlenker, Wolfram; Walker, W. Reed
作者单位：Columbia University; National Bureau of Economic Research; University of California System; University of California Berkeley
摘要：We link daily air pollution exposure to measures of contemporaneous health for communities surrounding the twelve largest airports in California. These airports are some of the largest sources of air pollution in the US, and they experience large changes in daily air pollution emissions depending on the amount of time planes spend idling on the tarmac. Excess airplane idling, measured as residual daily taxi time, is due to network delays originating in the Eastern US. This idiosyncratic variat...
-
作者：Hopenhayn, Hugo A.; Squintani, Francesco
作者单位：University of California System; University of California Los Angeles; University of Warwick
摘要：This article studies optimal patents with respect to the timing of innovation disclosure. In a simple model, we identify forces that lead firms to either suboptimally patent too early or too late in equilibrium, and we determine conditions so that stronger patents induce earlier or later equilibrium disclosure. Then, by solving an infinite multistage patent game with a more explicit structure, we describe innovation growth, and derive detailed predictions that can be used for policy experiment...
