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作者：Bloom, Nicholas; Draca, Mirko; Van Reenen, John
作者单位：Stanford University; University of Warwick; University of London; London School Economics & Political Science
摘要：We examine the impact of Chinese import competition on broad measures of technical change-patenting, IT, and TFP-using new panel data across twelve European countries from 1996 to 2007. In particular, we establish that the absolute volume of innovation increases within the firms most affected by Chinese imports in their output markets. We correct for endogeneity using the removal of product-specific quotas following China's entry into the World Trade Organization in 2001. Chinese import compet...
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作者：Cheng, Xu; Liao, Zhipeng; Schorfheide, Frank
作者单位：University of Pennsylvania; University of California System; University of California Los Angeles; National Bureau of Economic Research
摘要：In large-scale panel data models with latent factors the number of factors and their loadings may change over time. Treating the break date as unknown, this article proposes an adaptive group-LASSO estimator that consistently determines the numbers of pre- and post-break factors and the stability of factor loadings if the number of factors is constant. We develop a cross-validation procedure to fine-tune the data-dependent LASSO penalties and show that after the number of factors has been dete...
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作者：Muller, Ulrich K.; Watson, Markw.
作者单位：Princeton University
摘要：Long-run forecasts of economic variables play an important role in policy, planning, and portfolio decisions. We consider forecasts of the long-horizon average of a scalar variable, typically the growth rate of an economic variable. The main contribution is the construction of prediction sets with asymptotic coverage over a wide range of data generating processes, allowing for stochastically trending mean growth, slow mean reversion, and other types of long-run dependencies. We illustrate the ...
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作者：Augenblick, Ned
作者单位：University of California System; University of California Berkeley
摘要：This article theoretically and empirically analyses behaviour in penny auctions, a relatively new auction mechanism. As in the US dollars or war-of-attrition, players in penny auctions commit higher non-refundable costs as the auction continues and only win if all other players stop bidding. I first show that, in any equilibria that does not end immediately, players bid probabilistically such that the expected profit from every bid is zero. Then, using two large data sets covering 166,000 auct...
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作者：Del Negro, Marco; Primiceri, Giorgio E.
作者单位：Federal Reserve System - USA; Federal Reserve Bank - New York; Northwestern University
摘要：This note shows how to apply the procedure of Kim et al. (1998) to the estimation of VAR, DSGE, factor, and unobserved components models with stochastic volatility. In particular, it revisits the estimation algorithm of the time-varying VAR model of Primiceri (2005). The main difference of the new algorithm is the ordering of the various MCMC steps, with each individual step remaining the same.
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作者：Gayle, George-Levi; Miller, Robert A.
作者单位：Washington University (WUSTL); Carnegie Mellon University
摘要：This article analyses the identification and empirical content of the pure moral hazard (PMH) and the hybrid moral hazard (HMH) principal-agent models. The PMH model has hidden actions, while the HMH model has hidden information in addition to hidden actions. In both models, agents are risk averse and principals are risk neutral. The article derives the equilibrium restrictions from the optimal contract and uses the restrictions to show that the models have empirical content. For any given ris...
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作者：Yamashita, Takuro
作者单位：Universite de Toulouse; Universite Toulouse 1 Capitole; Toulouse School of Economics
摘要：We study the mechanism design problem of guaranteeing desirable performances whenever agents are rational in the sense of not playing weakly dominated strategies. We first provide an upper bound for the best performance we can guarantee among all feasible mechanisms. The bound is represented as the maximized value of the designer's objective subject to the inequality version of the standard envelope incentive conditions. We then prove the bound to be tight under certain conditions on the desig...
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作者：Wiswall, Matthew; Zafar, Basit
作者单位：Arizona State University; Arizona State University-Tempe; Federal Reserve System - USA; Federal Reserve Bank - New York
摘要：This article studies the determinants of college major choice using an experimentally generated panel of beliefs, obtained by providing students with information on the true population distribution of various major-specific characteristics. Students logically revise their beliefs in response to the information, and their subjective beliefs about future major choice are associated with beliefs about their own earnings and ability. We estimate a rich model of college major choice using the panel...
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作者：Mackowiak, Bartosz; Wiederholt, Mirko
作者单位：European Central Bank; Centre for Economic Policy Research - UK
摘要：We develop a dynamic stochastic general equilibrium (DSGE) model with rational inattention and compare its predictions to data. Households and decision-makers in firms have limited attention and optimally allocate their attention. Rational inattention is the only source of slow adjustment. The model matches the empirical impulse responses to monetary policy shocks and aggregate technology shocks. At the same time, profit losses and utility losses from inattention are very small. Furthermore, i...
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作者：Groes, Fane; Kircher, Philipp; Manovskii, Iourii
作者单位：Copenhagen Business School; University of Edinburgh; University of Pennsylvania
摘要：Using administrative panel data on the entire Danish population we document a new set of facts characterizing occupational mobility. For most occupations, mobility is U-shaped and directional: not only low but also high wage earners within an occupation have a particularly large probability of leaving their occupation, and the low (high) earners tend to switch to new occupations with lower (higher) average wages. Exceptions to this pattern of two-sided selection are occupations with steeply ri...
