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作者：Faria-e-Castro, Miguel; Martinez, Joseba; Philippon, Thomas
作者单位：New York University; New York University; National Bureau of Economic Research; Center for Economic & Policy Research (CEPR)
摘要：We study the optimal use of disclosure and fiscal backstops during financial crises. Providing information can reduce adverse selection in credit markets, but negative disclosures can also trigger inefficient bank runs. In our model, governments are thus forced to choose between runs and lemons. A fiscal backstop mitigates the cost of runs and allows a government to pursue a high disclosure strategy. Our model explains why governments with strong fiscal positions are more likely to run informa...
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作者：Landier, Augustin; Plantin, Guillaume
作者单位：Universite de Toulouse; Universite Toulouse 1 Capitole; Toulouse School of Economics; Institut d'Etudes Politiques Paris (Sciences Po)
摘要：Affluent households can respond to taxation with means that are not economically viable for the rest of the population, such as sophisticated tax plans and international tax arbitrage. This article studies an economy in which an inequality-averse social planner faces agents who have access to a tax-avoidance technology with subadditive costs, and who can shape the risk profile of their income as they see fit. Subadditive avoidance costs imply that optimal taxation cannot be progressive at the ...
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作者：Martimort, David; Semenov, Aggey; Stole, Lars
作者单位：Paris School of Economics; University of Ottawa; University of Chicago
摘要：We develop a theory of contracts with limited enforcement in the context of a dynamic relationship. The seller is privately informed on his persistent cost, while the buyer remains uninformed. Public enforcement relies on remedies for breaches. Private enforcement comes from terminating the relationship. We first characterize enforcement constraints under asymmetric information. Those constraints ensure that parties never breach contracts. In particular, a high-cost seller may be tempted to tr...
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作者：Dellavigna, Stefano; List, John A.; Malmendier, Ulrike; Rao, Gautam
作者单位：University of California System; University of California Berkeley; National Bureau of Economic Research; University of Chicago; Harvard University
摘要：Why do people vote? We design a field experiment to estimate a model of voting because others will ask. The expectation of being asked motivates turnout if individuals derive pride from telling others that they voted, or feel shame from admitting that they did not vote, provided that lying is costly. In a door-to-door survey about election turnout, we experimentally vary (1) the informational content and use of a flyer pre-announcing the survey, (2) the duration and payment for the survey, and...
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作者：Lipscomb, Molly; Mobarak, Ahmed Mushfiq
作者单位：University of Virginia; Yale University
摘要：Decentralization can improve service delivery, but it can also generate externalities across jurisdictional boundaries. We examine the nature and size of water pollution externalities as rivers flow across jurisdictions. Panel data on water pollution in Brazilian rivers coupled with county splits that change the locations of borders allow us to identify the spatial patterns of pollution as rivers approach and cross borders, controlling for fixed effects and trends specific to each location. Th...
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作者：Caldara, Dario; Kamps, Christophe
作者单位：Federal Reserve System - USA; Federal Reserve System Board of Governors; European Central Bank
摘要：Do tax cuts and spending increases stimulate output? Studies that identify fiscal shocks using structural vector autoregressions (SVAR) have reached different conclusions. In this article, we show analytically that this lack of consensus reflects different assumptions on the fiscal rules that-by relating tax and spending policies to macroeconomic conditions-determine the identification of fiscal shocks and the associated fiscal multipliers. We then propose a new identification strategy based o...
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作者：Chan, Marc K.
作者单位：University of Melbourne
摘要：A hyperbolic discounting model of labour supply and welfare participation with heterogeneous time preference parameters is estimated. Exclusion restrictions are constructed from variations in behaviour induced by time limits in a welfare reform experiment. We find that most individuals are time-inconsistent, and they exhibit varying degrees of present bias and perception of the commitment problem. Introducing a welfare component to the tax system can make individuals worse off by aggravating t...
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作者：Cabral, Marika
作者单位：University of Texas System; University of Texas Austin; National Bureau of Economic Research
摘要：Many health care treatments are not urgent and may be delayed if patients so choose. Because insurance coverage is typically determined by the treatment date, individuals may have incentives to strategically delay treatments to minimize out-of-pocket costs. The strategic delay of treatment-a particular form of moral hazard-can be an important source of subsequent adverse selection, in which ex ante identical individuals select insurance coverage based on their differing accumulation of previou...
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作者：Lee, Sangmok
作者单位：University of Pennsylvania
摘要：We study the manipulability of stable matching mechanisms. To quantify incentives to manipulate stable mechanisms, we consider markets with random cardinal utilities, which induce ordinal preferences over match partners. We show that most agents in large matching markets are close to being indifferent of overall stable matchings. In one-to-one matching, the utility gain by manipulating a stable mechanism does not exceed the gap between utilities from the best and worst stable partners. Thus, m...
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作者：Lindenlaub, Ilse
作者单位：Yale University
摘要：This article studies multidimensional matching between workers and jobs. Workers differ in manual and cognitive skills and sort into jobs that demand different combinations of these two skills. To study this multidimensional sorting problem, I develop a theoretical framework that generalizes the unidimensional notion of assortative matching and sufficient conditions on the technology under which sorting obtains. I derive the equilibrium in closed form and use this explicit solution to study bi...
