Policy Influence and Private Returns from Lobbying in the Energy Sector

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Kang, Karam
• 署名单位: Carnegie Mellon University
• 刊物名称: REVIEW OF ECONOMIC STUDIES
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0034-6527
• DOI: 10.1093/restud/rdv029
• 发表日期: 2016
• 页码: 269-305
• 关键词: vector-space model; rent-seeking; multiple equilibria; political-economy; public-goods; PROTECTION; sale; legislatures; INFORMATION; interests

摘要

In this article, I quantify the extent to which lobbying expenditures by firms affect policy enactment. To achieve this end, I construct a novel dataset containing all federal energy legislation and lobbying activities by the energy sector during the 110th Congress. I then develop and estimate a game-theoretic model where heterogeneous players choose lobbying expenditures to affect the probability that a policy is enacted. I find that the effect of lobbying expenditures on a policy's equilibrium enactment probability to be statistically significant but very small. Nonetheless, the average returns from lobbying expenditures are estimated to be over 130%.