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作者：Johnson, Justin P.
作者单位：Cornell University
摘要：I provide an analysis of vertical relations in markets with imperfect competition at both layers of the supply chain and where exchange is intermediated either with wholesale prices or revenue-sharing contracts. Revenue-sharing is extremely attractive to firms that are able to set the revenue shares but often makes the firms that set retail prices worse off. This is so whether revenue-sharing lowers or raises industry profits. These results are strengthened when a market moves from the wholesa...
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作者：Schumacher, Heiner; Kesternich, Iris; Kosfeld, Michael; Winter, Joachim
作者单位：KU Leuven; Goethe University Frankfurt; University of Munich
摘要：We experimentally analyse distributional preferences when a decider chooses the provision of a good that benefits herself or a receiver, and creates costs for a group of payers. The treatment variation is the number of payers. We observe that subjects provide the good even if there are many payers so that the costs of provision exceed the benefits by far. This result holds regardless of whether the provision increases the decider's payoff or not. Intriguingly, it is not only selfish or maximin...
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作者：Gershkov, Alex; Moldovanu, Benny; Shi, Xianwen
作者单位：Hebrew University of Jerusalem; University of Surrey; University of Bonn; University of Toronto
摘要：We derive the incentive compatible and ex-ante welfare maximizing (i.e. utilitarian) mechanism for settings with an arbitrary number of agents and alternatives where the privately informed agents have single-crossing and single-peaked preferences. The optimal outcome can be implemented by modifying a sequential voting scheme that is used in many legislatures and committees. The modification uses a flexible majority threshold for each of several alternatives, and allows us to replicate, via a s...
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作者：Egorov, Georgy; Harstad, Bard
作者单位：Northwestern University; National Bureau of Economic Research; University of Oslo
摘要：Public regulation is increasingly facing competition from private politics in the form of activism and corporate self-regulation. However, its effectiveness, welfare consequences, and interaction with public regulation are poorly understood. This article presents a unified dynamic framework for studying the interaction between public regulation, self-regulation, and boycotts. We show that the possibility of self-regulation saves on administrative costs, but also leads to delays. Without an act...
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作者：Ifrach, Bar; Weintraub, Gabriel Y.
作者单位：Airbnb; Stanford University
摘要：In this article we introduce a new computationally tractable framework for Ericson and Pakes-style dynamic oligopoly models that overcomes the computational complexity involved in computing Markov perfect equilibrium (MPE). First, we define a new equilibrium concept that we call moment-based Markov equilibrium (MME), in which firms keep track of their own state, the detailed state of dominant firms, and few moments of the distribution of fringe firms' states. Second, we provide guidelines to u...
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作者：Gentzkow, Matthew; Kamenica, Emir
作者单位：Stanford University; National Bureau of Economic Research; University of Chicago
摘要：We study symmetric information games where a number of senders choose what information to communicate. We show that the impact of competition on information revelation is ambiguous in general. We identify a condition on the information environment (i.e. the set of signals available to each sender) that is necessary and sufficient for equilibrium outcomes to be no less informative than the collusive outcome, regardless of preferences. The same condition also provides an easy way to characterize...
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作者：Harstad, Bard; Mideksa, Torben K.
作者单位：University of Oslo
摘要：This article provides a flexible model of resource extraction, such as deforestation, and derives the optimal conservation contract. When property rights are strong and districts are in charge of extracting their own resources to get revenues, conservation in one district benefits the others since the reduced supply raises the sales price. A central authority would internalize this positive externality and thus conserve more. When property rights are instead weak and extraction is illegal or c...
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作者：Hoderlein, Stefan; Holzmann, Hajo; Kasy, Maximilian; Meister, Alexander
作者单位：Boston College; Philipps University Marburg; Harvard University; University of Rostock
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作者：Bobtcheff, Catherine; Bolte, Jerome; Mariotti, Thomas
作者单位：Universite de Toulouse; Universite Toulouse 1 Capitole; Toulouse School of Economics; Universite de Toulouse; Center for Economic & Policy Research (CEPR); Leibniz Association; Ifo Institut
摘要：We propose and analyse a general model of priority races. Researchers privately have breakthroughs and decide how long to let their ideas mature before disclosing them, thereby establishing priority. Two-researcher, symmetric priority races have a unique equilibrium that can be characterized by a differential equation. We study how the shapes of the breakthrough distribution and of the returns to maturation affect maturation delays and research quality, both in dynamic and comparative statics ...
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作者：Davila, Eduardo; Korinek, Anton
