Runs versus Lemons: Information Disclosure and Fiscal Capacity

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Faria-e-Castro, Miguel; Martinez, Joseba; Philippon, Thomas
• 署名单位: New York University; New York University; National Bureau of Economic Research; Center for Economic & Policy Research (CEPR)
• 刊物名称: REVIEW OF ECONOMIC STUDIES
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0034-6527
• DOI: 10.1093/restud/rdw060
• 发表日期: 2017
• 页码: 1683-1707
• 关键词: Adverse selection; Deposit insurance; Rollover risk; global games; BANK; COORDINATION; MARKET

摘要

We study the optimal use of disclosure and fiscal backstops during financial crises. Providing information can reduce adverse selection in credit markets, but negative disclosures can also trigger inefficient bank runs. In our model, governments are thus forced to choose between runs and lemons. A fiscal backstop mitigates the cost of runs and allows a government to pursue a high disclosure strategy. Our model explains why governments with strong fiscal positions are more likely to run informative stress tests, and, paradoxically, how they can end up spending less than governments that are more fiscally constrained.