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作者：Madarasz, Kristof; Prat, Andrea
作者单位：University of London; London School Economics & Political Science; Columbia University
摘要：Principals often operate on misspecified models of their agents' preferences. When preferences are such that non-local incentive constraints may bind in the optimum, even slight misspecification of the preferences can lead to large and non-vanishing losses. Instead, we propose a two-step scheme whereby the principal: (1) identifies the model-optimal menu; and (2) modifies prices by offering to share with the agent a fixed proportion of the profit she would receive if an item were sold at the m...
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作者：Dellavigna, Stefano; Hermle, Johannes
作者单位：University of California System; University of California Berkeley; National Bureau of Economic Research
摘要：Media outlets are increasingly owned by conglomerates, inducing a conflict of interest: a media outlet can bias its coverage to benefit companies in the same group. We test for bias by examining movie reviews in media outlets owned by News Corp, such as the Wall Street Journal, and Time Warner, such as Time. We find higher ratings for 20th Century Fox movies in News Corp. outlets compared to movies by other studios. To disentangle bias from correlation of taste, we introduce and validate a nov...
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作者：Grieco, Paul L. E.; Mcdevitt, Ryan C.
作者单位：Pennsylvania Commonwealth System of Higher Education (PCSHE); Pennsylvania State University; Pennsylvania State University - University Park; Duke University
摘要：We show that healthcare providers face a tradeoff between increasing the number of patients they treat and improving their quality of care. To measure the magnitude of this quality-quantity tradeoff, we estimate a model of dialysis provision that explicitly incorporates a centre's unobservable and endogenous choice of treatment quality while allowing for unobserved differences in productivity across centres. We find that a centre that reduces its quality standards such that its expected rate o...
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作者：Dingel, Jonathan I.
作者单位：University of Chicago
摘要：A growing literature suggests that high-income countries export high-quality goods. Two hypotheses may explain such specialization, with different implications for welfare, inequality, and trade policy. Fajgelbaum et al. formalize the Linder hypothesis that home demand determines the pattern of specialization and, therefore, predict that high-income locations export high-quality products. The factor-proportions model also predicts that skill-abundant, high-income locations export skill-intensi...
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作者：Bonatti, Alessandro; Cisternas, Gonzalo; Toikka, Juuso
作者单位：Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT); Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT)
摘要：We consider learning and signalling in a dynamic Cournot oligopoly where firms have private information about their production costs and only observe the market price, which is subject to unobservable demand shocks. An equilibrium is Markov if play depends on the history only through the firms' beliefs about costs and calendar time. We characterize symmetric linear Markov equilibria as solutions to a boundary value problem. In every such equilibrium, given a long enough horizon, play converges...
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作者：Chen, Yi-Chun; Di Tillio, Alfredo; Faingold, Eduardo; Xiong, Siyang
作者单位：National University of Singapore; Bocconi University; Bocconi University; Yale University; Yale University; University of Bristol
摘要：Previous research has established that the predictions of game theory are quite sensitive to the assumptions made about the players' beliefs. We evaluate the severity of this robustness problem by characterizing conditions on the primitives of the model-the players' beliefs and higher-order beliefs about the payoff-relevant parameters-for the behaviour of a given Harsanyi type to be approximated by the behaviour of (a sequence of) perturbed types. This amounts to providing belief-based charact...
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作者：Merlo, Antonio; De Paula, Aureo
作者单位：Rice University; University of London; University College London; Getulio Vargas Foundation
摘要：This article studies the non-parametric identification and estimation of voters' preferences when voters are ideological. We establish that voter preference distributions and other parameters of interest can be identified from aggregate electoral data. We also show that these objects can be consistently estimated and illustrate our analysis by performing an actual estimation using data from the 1999 European Parliament elections.
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作者：Pagel, Michaela
作者单位：Columbia University
摘要：This study incorporates a recent preference specification of expectations-based loss aversion, which has been applied broadly in microeconomics, into a classic macro model to offer a unified explanation for three empirical observations about life-cycle consumption. First, loss aversion explains excess smoothness and sensitivity-that is, the empirical observation that consumption responds to income shocks with a lag. Intuitively, such lagged responses allow the agent to delay painful losses in ...
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作者：Vives, Xavier
作者单位：University of Navarra; IESE Business School
摘要：This article performs a welfare analysis of markets with private information in which agents condition on prices in the rational expectations tradition. Price-contingent strategies introduce two externalities in the use of private information: a pecuniary externality and a learning externality. The pecuniary externality induces agents to put too much weight on private information and in the standard case, when the allocation role of the price prevails over its informational role, overwhelms th...
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作者：Demarzo, Peter M.; Sannikov, Yuliy
作者单位：Stanford University; Princeton University
摘要：We study a principal-agent setting in which both sides learn about future profitability from output, and the project can be abandoned/terminated if profitability is too low. With learning, shirking by the agent both reduces output and lowers the principal's estimate of future profitability. The agent can exploit this belief discrepancy and earn information rents, reducing his incentives to exert effort. The optimal contract controls information rents to improve incentives by distorting the ter...
