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作者：Bianchi, Francesco; Ilut, Cosmin; Saijo, Hikaru
作者单位：Johns Hopkins University; Centre for Economic Policy Research - UK; National Bureau of Economic Research; Duke University; University of California System; University of California Santa Cruz
摘要：A large psychology literature argues that, due to selective memory recall, decision-makers' forecasts of the future are overly influenced by the perceived news. We adopt the diagnostic expectations (DE) paradigm [Bordalo et al. (2018), Journal of Finance, 73, 199-227] to capture this feature of belief formation, develop a method to incorporate DE in business cycle models, and study the implications for aggregate dynamics. First, we address (1) the theoretical challenges associated with modelli...
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作者：Vidart, Daniela
作者单位：University of Connecticut
摘要：This paper revisits the link between electrification and the rise in female labour force participation (LFP), and presents theoretical and empirical evidence showing that electrification triggered a rise in female LFP by increasing market opportunities for skilled women. I formalize my theory in an overlapping generations model and find that my mechanism explains one quarter of the rise in female LFP during the rollout of electricity in the U.S. (1880-1940), and matches the slow decline in fem...
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作者：Ispano, Alessandro; Vida, Peter
作者单位：Universite Bourgogne Europe; CY Cergy Paris Universite; Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS); Corvinus University Budapest; Corvinus University Budapest
摘要：We provide a model of interrogations with two-sided asymmetric information. The suspect knows his status as guilty or innocent and the likely strength of the law enforcer's evidence, which is informative about the suspect's status and may also disprove lies. We compare prosecution errors in the equilibrium of the one-shot interrogation and in the optimal mechanism under full commitment. We describe a back-and-forth interrogation with disclosure of the evidence that implements the optimum in eq...
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作者：Eeckhout, Jan; Sepahsalari, Alireza
作者单位：Pompeu Fabra University; University of Bristol
摘要：We propose a theory that analyzes how a workers' asset holdings affect their job productivity. In a labor market with uninsurable risk, workers choose to direct their job search trading off productivity and wages against unemployment risk. Workers with low asset holdings have a precautionary job search motive, they direct their search to low productivity jobs because those offer a low risk at the cost of low productivity and a low wage. Our main theoretical contribution shows that the presence...
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作者：Backus, Matthew; Lewis, Greg
作者单位：University of California System; University of California Berkeley; Center for Economic & Policy Research (CEPR); National Bureau of Economic Research
摘要：We study demand estimation in a large auction market. In our model, a dynamically evolving population of buyers with unit demand and heterogeneous and privately known preferences for a finite set of differentiated products compete in a sequence of auctions that occur in discrete time. We define an empirically tractable equilibrium concept in which bidders behave as though they are competing with the stationary distribution of opposing bids, characterize bidding strategies, and prove existence ...
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作者：Gulzar, Saad; Khan, Muhammad Yasir
作者单位：Princeton University; Pennsylvania Commonwealth System of Higher Education (PCSHE); University of Pittsburgh
摘要：How can we motivate good politicians-those that will carry out policy that is responsive to citizens' preferences-to enter politics? In a field experiment in Pakistan, we vary how political office is portrayed to ordinary citizens. Emphasizing prosocial motives for holding political office instead of personal returns-such as the ability to help others versus enhancing one's own respect and status-raises the likelihood that individuals run for office and that voters elect them. A year later, th...
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作者：Liu, Ernest; Tsyvinski, Aleh
作者单位：Princeton University; Yale University
摘要：We develop a dynamic model of input-output networks that incorporates adjustment costs of changing inputs. Our closed-form solution for the dynamics of the economy shows that temporary shocks to upstream sectors, whose output travels through long supply chains, have disproportionately significant welfare impact compared to affected sectors' Domar weights. We conduct a spectral analysis of the U.S. production network and reveal that the welfare impact of temporary sectoral shocks can be represe...
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作者：Asriyan, Vladimir; Vanasco, Victoria
作者单位：ICREA; Centre de Recerca en Economia Internacional (CREI); Pompeu Fabra University; Centre de Recerca en Economia Internacional (CREI); Pompeu Fabra University
摘要：We study the problem of a seller (e.g. a bank) who is privately informed about the quality of her asset and wants to exploit gains from trade with uninformed buyers (e.g. investors) by issuing securities backed by her asset cash flows. In our setting, buyers post menus of contracts to screen the seller, but the seller cannot commit to trade with only one buyer, i.e. markets are non-exclusive. We show that non-exclusive markets behave very differently from exclusive ones: (1) separating contrac...
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作者：Farhi, Emmanuel; Tirole, Jean
作者单位：Universite de Toulouse; Universite Toulouse 1 Capitole; Toulouse School of Economics
摘要：Authorities' support policies shape the location and continuation of industrial and banking activity on their soil. Firms' locus of activity depends on their prospect of receiving financial assistance in distress and therefore on factors such as countries' relative resilience. We predict that global firms are global in life and national in death; and that they become less global when competition is more intense, times are turbulent, and international risk sharing (say, through swap lines) weak...
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作者：Grotteria, Marco
作者单位：University of London; London Business School
摘要：I study, both empirically and theoretically, the economic and financial consequences of corporate lobbying. Firms lobby politicians to increase their share of government contracts, but political competition creates firm-level risk, inflating their cost of capital and reducing their incentive to invest in research and development (R&D). I document an annual 6-8% return premium for stocks of high-lobbying firms, which compensates investors for political risk. An estimated model in which firms ca...
