Good Politicians: Experimental Evidence on Motivations for Political Candidacy and Government Performance

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Gulzar, Saad; Khan, Muhammad Yasir
• 署名单位: Princeton University; Pennsylvania Commonwealth System of Higher Education (PCSHE); University of Pittsburgh
• 刊物名称: REVIEW OF ECONOMIC STUDIES
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0034-6527
• DOI: 10.1093/restud/rdae026
• 发表日期: 2024
• 页码: 339-364
• 关键词: field experiment; public-service; incentives; state; COOPERATION; officials; patronage; selection; returns; capture

摘要

How can we motivate good politicians-those that will carry out policy that is responsive to citizens' preferences-to enter politics? In a field experiment in Pakistan, we vary how political office is portrayed to ordinary citizens. Emphasizing prosocial motives for holding political office instead of personal returns-such as the ability to help others versus enhancing one's own respect and status-raises the likelihood that individuals run for office and that voters elect them. A year later, the treatment improves the alignment of policy with citizens' preferences. These effects emerge only when treatments are randomly delivered in a public setting. Taken together, the results demonstrate that how politics is perceived shapes who decides to run for office, who is elected, as well the policies that democracies deliver.