Designing Interrogations

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Ispano, Alessandro; Vida, Peter
• 署名单位: Universite Bourgogne Europe; CY Cergy Paris Universite; Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS); Corvinus University Budapest; Corvinus University Budapest
• 刊物名称: REVIEW OF ECONOMIC STUDIES
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0034-6527
• DOI: 10.1093/restud/rdae002
• 发表日期: 2024
• 页码: 3504-3531
• 关键词: information; silence; COMMUNICATION; confessions; suspects; burden; CONSEQUENCES; persuasion; interviews; experts

摘要

We provide a model of interrogations with two-sided asymmetric information. The suspect knows his status as guilty or innocent and the likely strength of the law enforcer's evidence, which is informative about the suspect's status and may also disprove lies. We compare prosecution errors in the equilibrium of the one-shot interrogation and in the optimal mechanism under full commitment. We describe a back-and-forth interrogation with disclosure of the evidence that implements the optimum in equilibrium without any commitment.