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作者：Parlour, Christine A.; Walden, Johan
作者单位：University of California System; University of California Berkeley
摘要：We present a tractable general equilibrium model with multiple sectors in which firms offer workers incentive contracts and simultaneously raise capital in stock markets. Workers optimally invest in the stock market and at the same time hedge labour income risk. Firms rationally take agents' portfolio decisions into account. In equilibrium, the cost of capital of each sector is endogenous. The distortion induced by moral hazard generates counterintuitive effects on the real economy. For exampl...
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作者：Yared, Pierre
作者单位：Columbia University
摘要：The standard analysis of the efficient management of income taxes and debt assumes a benevolent government and ignores potential distortions arising from rent-seeking politicians. This paper departs from this framework by assuming that a rent-seeking politician chooses policies. If the politician chooses extractive policies, citizens throw him out of power. We analyse the efficient sustainable equilibrium. Unlike in the standard economy, temporary economic shocks generate volatile and persiste...
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作者：Unver, M. Utku
作者单位：Boston College
摘要：We study how barter exchanges should be conducted through a centralized mechanism in a dynamically evolving agent pool with time-and compatibility-based preferences. We derive the dynamically efficient two-way and multi-way exchange mechanisms that maximize total discounted exchange surplus. Recently several live-donor kidney exchange programmes were established to swap incompatible donors of end-stage kidney disease patients. Since kidney exchange can be modelled as a special instance of our ...
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作者：Adams, Renee; Ferreira, Daniel
作者单位：University of Queensland; Centre for Economic Policy Research - UK; University of London; London School Economics & Political Science
摘要：We use a large sample of guessed ice break-up dates for the Tanana River in Alaska to study differences between outcomes of decisions made by individuals versus groups. We estimate the distribution of guesses conditional on whether they were made by individual bettors or betting pools. We document two major distinctions between the two sets of guesses: (1) the distribution of guesses made by groups of bettors appears to conform more to the distribution of historical break-up dates than the dis...
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作者：Buchinsky, Moshe; Fougere, Denis; Kramarz, Francis; Tchernis, Rusty
作者单位：University of California System; University of California Los Angeles; National Bureau of Economic Research; Institut Polytechnique de Paris; ENSAE Paris; Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS); University System of Georgia; Georgia State University
摘要：In this paper, we expand on the seminal work of Altonji and Shakotko (1987) and Topel (1991) and reinvestigate the returns to seniority in the United States. We begin with the same wage equation as in previous studies. We extend the model of Hyslop (1999) and explicitly model the participation/employment and inter-firm mobility decisions, which, in turn, define the individual's experience and seniority. We introduce into the wage equation a summary of the workers' entire career path. The three...
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作者：Beaudry, Paul; Francois, Patrick
作者单位：Canadian Institute for Advanced Research (CIFAR); University of British Columbia; National Bureau of Economic Research
摘要：Why don't all countries converge rapidly to the use of most efficient or best practice technologies? Micro level studies suggest managerial skills play a key role in the adoption of modern technologies. In this paper we model the interactive process between on-the-job managerial skill acquisition and the adoption of modern technology. We use the model to illustrate why some countries develop managerial skills quickly and adopt best practice technologies, while others stay backwards. The model ...
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作者：Nakamura, Emi; Zerom, Dawit
作者单位：Columbia University; California State University System; California State University Fullerton
摘要：Recent theoretical work has suggested a number of potentially important factors in causing incomplete pass-through of exchange rates to prices, including markup adjustment, local costs and barriers to price adjustment. We empirically analyse the determinants of incomplete pass-through in the coffee industry. The observed pass-through in this industry replicates key features of pass-through documented in aggregate data: prices respond sluggishly and incompletely to changes in costs. We use micr...
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作者：Sutter, Matthias; Haigner, Stefan; Kocher, Martin G.
作者单位：University of Innsbruck; University of Gothenburg; University of Munich
摘要：We analyse an experimental public goods game in which group members can endogenously determine whether they want to supplement a standard voluntary contribution mechanism with the possibility of rewarding or punishing other group members. We find a significantly positive effect of endogenous institutional choice on the level of cooperation in comparison to the same exogenously implemented institutions. This suggests that participation rights enhance cooperation in groups. With endogenous choic...
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作者：Van Nieuwerburgh, Stijn; Weill, Pierre-Olivier
作者单位：New York University; National Bureau of Economic Research; University of California System; University of California Los Angeles
摘要：We set up and solve a spatial, dynamic equilibrium model of the housing market based on two main assumptions: households with heterogenous abilities flow in and out metropolitan areas in response to local wage shocks, and the housing supply cannot adjust instantly because of regulatory constraints. In our equilibrium, house prices compensate for cross-sectional productivity differences. We increase productivity dispersion in the calibrated model in order to match the 30-year increase in cross-...
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作者：Bolton, Patrick; Faure-Grimaud, Antoine
作者单位：Columbia University; University of London; London School Economics & Political Science
摘要：We propose a model of equilibrium contracting between two agents who are boundedly rational in the sense that they face time costs of deliberating current and future transactions. We show that equilibrium contracts may be incomplete and assign control rights: they may leave some enforceable future transactions unspecified and instead specify which agent has the right to decide these transactions. Control rights allow the controlling agent to defer time-consuming deliberations on those transact...
