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作者：Apesteguia, Jose; Ballester, Miguel A.; Ferrer, Rosa
作者单位：Pompeu Fabra University; Autonomous University of Barcelona
摘要：Which decision rules are the most efficient? Which are the best in terms of maximin or maximax? We study these questions for the case of a group of individuals faced with a collective choice from a set of alternatives. A key message from our results is that the set of optimal decision rules is well defined, particularly simple, and well known: the class of scoring rules. We provide the optimal scoring rules for the three different ideals of justice under consideration: utilitarianism (efficien...
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作者：Moretti, Enrico
作者单位：University of California System; University of California Berkeley; National Bureau of Economic Research; Centre for Economic Policy Research - UK; IZA Institute Labor Economics
摘要：Using box-office data for all movies released between 1982 and 2000, I quantify how much the consumption decisions of individuals depend on information they receive from their peers, when quality is ex ante uncertain. In the presence of social learning, we should see different box-office sales dynamics depending on whether opening weekend demand is higher or lower than expected. I use a unique feature of the movie industry to identify ex ante demand expectations: the number of screens dedicate...
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作者：Krasnokutskaya, Elena
作者单位：University of Pennsylvania
摘要：In many procurement auctions, the bidders' unobserved costs depend both on a common shock and on idiosyncratic private information. Assuming a multiplicative structure, I derive sufficient conditions under which the model is identified and propose a non-parametric estimation procedure that results in uniformly consistent estimators of the cost components' distributions. The estimation procedure is applied to data from Michigan highway procurement auctions. Private information is estimated to a...
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作者：Moen, Espen R.; Rosen, Asa
作者单位：BI Norwegian Business School; Stockholm University
摘要：This paper proposes a labour market model with job search frictions where workers have private information on match quality and effort. Firms use wage contracts to motivate workers. In addition, wages are also used to attract employees. We define and characterize competitive search equilibrium in this context, and show that it satisfies a simple modified Hosios rule. We also analyse the interplay between macroeconomic variables and optimal wage contracts. Finally, we show that private informat...
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作者：Taylor, Curtis R.; Yildirim, Huseyin
作者单位：Duke University
摘要：The incentive and project selection effects of agent anonymity are investigated in a setting where an evaluator observes a subjective signal of project quality. Although the evaluator cannot commit ex ante to an acceptance criterion, she decides up front between informed review, where the agent's ability is directly observable, or blind review, where it is not. An ideal acceptance criterion balances the goals of incentive provision and project selection. Relative to this, informed review resul...
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作者：Liu, Qingmin
作者单位：University of Pennsylvania
摘要：We study dynamic incentives and behaviour in markets with costly discovery of past transactions. In our model, a sequence of short-lived customers interact over time with a single long-lived firm that privately knows its type (good or opportunistic). Customers must pay to observe the firm's past behaviour. We characterize the equilibrium structure that features accumulation, consumption, and restoration of reputation. The opportunistic firm deliberately builds its reputation up to a point wher...
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作者：Kessler, Anke S.; Hansen, Nico A.; Lessmann, Christian
作者单位：Simon Fraser University; Technische Universitat Dresden
摘要：The paper studies the effects and the determinants of interregional redistribution in a model of residential and political choice. We find that paradoxical consequences of interjurisdictional transfers arise if people are mobile: while self-sufficient regions are necessarily identical with respect to policies and average incomes in our model, interregional redistribution always leads to the divergence of regional policies and per capita incomes. Thus, interregional redistribution prevents inte...
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作者：Broner, Fernando; Ventura, Jaume
作者单位：Pompeu Fabra University
摘要：We study the effects of globalization on risk sharing and welfare. Like the previous literature, we assume that governments cannot commit to enforce the repayment of debts owed by their citizens. Unlike the previous literature, we assume that governments cannot discriminate between domestic and foreign creditors when enforcing debt payments. This creates novel interactions between domestic and international trade in assets. (i) Increases in domestic trade raise the benefits of enforcement and ...
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作者：Park, Jee-Hyeong
作者单位：Seoul National University (SNU)
摘要：To analyse the role that the World Trade Organization (WTO) plays in enforcing international trade agreements, this paper first explores what countries can achieve alone by characterizing optimal private trigger strategies (PTS) under which each country triggers a punishment phase by imposing an explicit tariff based on privately observed imperfect signals of the other country's concealed trade barriers. It identifies the condition under which countries can restrain the use of concealed barrie...
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作者：Cherchye, Laurens; De Rock, Bram; Vermeulen, Frederic
作者单位：Tilburg University; KU Leuven; Universite Libre de Bruxelles
摘要：We present a revealed preference methodology for empirically analysing collective consumption behaviour. First, we introduce an integer programming (IP) methodology for testing data consistency with collective consumption models that account for publicly as well as privately consumed goods. This IP methodology can include information on assignable quantities for private goods. Next, we show that the IP methodology allows for recovering the personalized (Lindahl) prices for the public goods and...
