Incentives in Competitive Search Equilibrium

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Moen, Espen R.; Rosen, Asa
• 署名单位: BI Norwegian Business School; Stockholm University
• 刊物名称: REVIEW OF ECONOMIC STUDIES
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0034-6527
• DOI: 10.1093/restud/rdq011
• 发表日期: 2011
• 页码: 733-761
• 关键词: unemployment; EFFICIENCY; wage; fluctuations; DYNAMICS

摘要

This paper proposes a labour market model with job search frictions where workers have private information on match quality and effort. Firms use wage contracts to motivate workers. In addition, wages are also used to attract employees. We define and characterize competitive search equilibrium in this context, and show that it satisfies a simple modified Hosios rule. We also analyse the interplay between macroeconomic variables and optimal wage contracts. Finally, we show that private information may increase the responsiveness of the unemployment rate to changes in the aggregate productivity level and, in particular, to changes in the information structure.