On the Justice of Decision Rules
成果类型：
Article
署名作者：
Apesteguia, Jose; Ballester, Miguel A.; Ferrer, Rosa
署名单位：
Pompeu Fabra University; Autonomous University of Barcelona
刊物名称：
REVIEW OF ECONOMIC STUDIES
ISSN/ISSBN：
0034-6527
DOI：
10.1093/restud/rdq023
发表日期：
2011
页码：
1-16
关键词：
摘要：
Which decision rules are the most efficient? Which are the best in terms of maximin or maximax? We study these questions for the case of a group of individuals faced with a collective choice from a set of alternatives. A key message from our results is that the set of optimal decision rules is well defined, particularly simple, and well known: the class of scoring rules. We provide the optimal scoring rules for the three different ideals of justice under consideration: utilitarianism (efficiency), maximin, and maximax. The optimal utilitarian scoring rule depends crucially on the probability distribution of the utilities. The optimal maximin (respectively maximax) scoring rule takes the optimal utilitarian scoring rule and applies a factor that shifts it towards negative voting (respectively plurality voting).