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作者：Nguyen, Anh
作者单位：Carnegie Mellon University
摘要：This paper explores the impact of information design on the auctioneer's revenue in the U.S. offshore oil/gas lease auctions where, post-auction, the winner decides whether to explore the auctioned tract and must pay the government a royalty on its production value. I first document that there is a positive correlation between the exploration rate and publicly observed losing bids. This suggests that the winning bidder uses the rivals' bids to infer their private information about the tract's ...
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作者：Andrews, Isaiah; Shapiro, Jesse M.
作者单位：Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT); National Bureau of Economic Research; Harvard University
摘要：We cast the problem of communicating scientific uncertainty as one of reporting a posterior distribution on an unknown parameter to an audience of Bayesian decision-makers. We establish novel bounds on the audience's regret when the analyst reports an approximation to a posterior that the audience treats as exact. Under a palatable restriction on the audience's decision problems, the bounds take an especially convenient form. Under a further restriction on the audience's priors, a bootstrap di...
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作者：Baqaee, David; Burstein, Ariel; Duprez, Cedric; Farhi, Emmanuel
作者单位：University of California System; University of California Los Angeles; University of Mons
摘要：Consumer surplus, the area between the demand curve and the price, plays a key role in many models of trade and growth. Quantifying it typically requires estimating and extrapolating demand curves. This paper provides an alternative approach to measuring consumer surplus by focusing on firms as consumers of inputs. We show that the elasticity of a downstream firm's marginal cost to supplier additions and separations measures the downstream firm's consumer surplus relative to its input costs. U...
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作者：Basu, Suman S.; Boz, Emine; Gopinath, Gita; Roch, Francisco; Unsal, D. Filiz
作者单位：International Monetary Fund; Universidad Torcuato Di Tella; Organisation for Economic Co-operation & Development (OECD)
摘要：We develop a tractable small-open-economy framework to characterize the constrained efficient use of the monetary policy rate, foreign exchange (FX) intervention, capital controls, and domestic macroprudential measures. The model features dominant currency pricing, positive premia on local currency debt arising from financiers' portfolio constraints, and occasionally-binding external and domestic borrowing constraints. We characterize the conditions under which the traditional prescription-rel...
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作者：Imbens, Guido W.; Bandiera, Oriana; Halac, Marina; Ho, Kate; Jones, Charles I.; Pathak, Parag; Trebbi, Francesco; Yariv, Leeat
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作者：Bhattacharya, Vivek; Illanes, Gaston; Padi, Manisha
作者单位：Northwestern University; National Bureau of Economic Research; University of California System; University of California Berkeley
摘要：Fiduciary duty aims to solve principal-agent problems, and the United States is in the middle of a protracted debate surrounding the merits of extending it to all financial advisers. Leveraging a transaction-level data set of deferred annuities and state-level variation in common law fiduciary duty, we find that it raises risk-adjusted returns by 25 bp and leads to a 16% decline in the entry of affected firms. Through the lens of a model of entry and advice provision, we show that this effect ...
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作者：Kolotilin, Anton; Zapechelnyuk, Andriy
作者单位：University of Edinburgh
摘要：A principal can restrict an agent's information (the persuasion problem) or discretion (the delegation problem). We study these two problems under standard single-crossing assumptions on the agent's marginal utility. We show that these problems are equivalent on the set of monotone stochastic mechanisms, implying, in particular, the equivalence of deterministic delegation and monotone partitional persuasion. We also show that the monotonicity restriction is superfluous for linear persuasion an...
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作者：Ely, Jeffrey C.; Georgiadis, George; Rayo, Luis
作者单位：Northwestern University; Northwestern University
摘要：We study the joint design of dynamic incentives and performance feedback for an environment with a coarse (all-or-nothing) measure of performance, and show that hiding information from the agent can be an optimal way to motivate effort. Using a novel approach to incentive compatibility, we derive a two-phase solution that begins with a silent phase where the agent is given no feedback and is asked to work non-stop, and ends with a full-transparency phase where the agent stops working as soon a...
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作者：Weber, Michael; Candia, Bernardo; Afrouzi, Hassan; Ropele, Tiziano; Lluberas, Rodrigo; Frache, Serafin; Meyer, Brent; Kumar, Saten; Gorodnichenko, Yuriy; Georgarakos, Dimitris; Coibion, Olivier; Kenny, Geoff; Ponce, Jorge
作者单位：National Bureau of Economic Research; University of California System; University of California Berkeley; Columbia University; European Central Bank; Bank of Italy; University ORT Uruguay; Universidad de Montevideo; Federal Reserve System - USA; Federal Reserve Bank - Atlanta; Auckland University of Technology; European Central Bank; Centre for Economic Policy Research - UK; University of Texas System; University of Texas Austin
摘要：Using randomized control trials (RCTs) applied over time in different countries, we study whether the economic environment affects how agents learn from new information. We show that as inflation rose in advanced economies, both households and firms became more attentive and informed about publicly available news about inflation, leading them to respond less to exogenously provided information about inflation and monetary policy. We also study the effects of RCTs in countries where inflation h...
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作者：Ng, Serena; Pavan, Alessandro
