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作者：Freyberger, Joachim; Larsen, Bradley J.
作者单位：University of Bonn; Washington University (WUSTL); National Bureau of Economic Research
摘要：This study provides a structural analysis of detailed, alternating-offer bargaining data from eBay, deriving bounds on buyers and sellers private value distributions and the gains from trade using a range of assumptions on behavior and the informational environment. These assumptions range from weak (assuming only that acceptance and rejection decisions are rational) to less weak (e.g., assuming that bargaining offers are weakly increasing in players' private values). We estimate the bounds an...
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作者：Chen, Jiafeng
作者单位：Stanford University
摘要：Gaussian empirical Bayes methods usually maintain a precision independence assumption: The unknown parameters of interest are independent from the known standard errors of the estimates. This assumption is often theoretically questionable and empirically rejected. This paper proposes to model the conditional distribution of the parameter given the standard errors as a flexibly parameterized location-scale family of distributions, leading to a family of methods that we call close. The close fra...
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作者：Spady, Richard H.; Stouli, Sami
作者单位：Johns Hopkins University; University of Oxford; University of Bristol; University of Melbourne
摘要：We propose flexible Gaussian representations for conditional cumulative distribution functions and give a concave likelihood criterion for their estimation. Optimal representations satisfy the monotonicity property of conditional cumulative distribution functions, including in finite samples and under general misspecification. We use these representations to provide a unified framework for the flexible maximum likelihood estimation of conditional density, cumulative distribution, and quantile ...
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作者：Liu, Tingjun; Bernhardt, Dan
作者单位：University of Hong Kong; University of Illinois System; University of Illinois Chicago; University of Illinois Chicago Hospital; University of Warwick
摘要：We consider a classical auction setting in which an asset/project is sold to buyers who privately receive signals about expected payoffs, and payoffs are more sensitive to a bidder's signal if he runs the project than if another bidder does. We show that a seller can increase revenues by sometimes allocating cash-flow rights and control to different bidders, for example, with the highest bidder receiving cash flows and the second-highest receiving control. Separation reduces a bidder's informa...
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作者：Dekel, Eddie; Quah, John K. -H.; Sinander, Ludvig
作者单位：Northwestern University; Tel Aviv University; National University of Singapore; University of Oxford; University of Oxford
摘要：We develop a theory of monotone comparative statics for models with adjustment costs. We show that comparative-statics conclusions may be drawn under the usual ordinal complementarity assumptions on the objective function, assuming very little about costs: only a mild monotonicity condition is required. We use this insight to prove a general Le Chatelier principle: under the ordinal complementarity assumptions, if short-run adjustment is subject to a monotone cost, then the long-run response t...
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作者：Hristakeva, Sylvia
作者单位：Cornell University
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作者：Abel, Andrew B.; Panageas, Stavros
作者单位：University of Pennsylvania; University of California System; University of California Los Angeles
摘要：Government debt can be rolled over forever without primary surpluses in some stochastic economies, including some economies that are dynamically efficient. In an overlapping-generations model with constant growth rate, g, of labor-augmenting productivity, and with shocks to the durability of capital, we show that along a balanced growth path, the maximum sustainable ratio of bonds to capital is attained when the risk-free interest rate, r f, equals g. Furthermore, this maximal ratio maximizes ...
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作者：Garin, Andrew; Koustas, Dmitri; Mcpherson, Carl; Norris, Samuel; Pecenco, Matthew; Rose, Evan K.; Shem-Tov, Yotam; Weaver, Jeffrey
作者单位：Carnegie Mellon University; National Bureau of Economic Research; University of Chicago; University of California System; University of California Berkeley; University of British Columbia; Brown University; University of Chicago; University of California System; University of California Los Angeles; University of Southern California
摘要：We study the effect of incarceration on wages, self-employment, and taxes and transfers in North Carolina and Ohio using two quasi-experimental research designs: discontinuities in sentencing guidelines and random assignment to judges. Across both states, incarceration generates short-term drops in economic activity while individuals remain in prison. As a result, a year-long sentence decreases cumulative earnings over five years by 13%. Beyond five years, however, there is no evidence of lowe...
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作者：Kwon, Soonwoo
作者单位：Brown University
摘要：Shrinkage methods are frequently used to improve the precision of least squares estimators of fixed effects. However, widely used shrinkage estimators guarantee improved precision only under strong distributional assumptions. I develop an estimator for the fixed effects that obtains the best possible mean squared error within a class of shrinkage estimators. This class includes conventional shrinkage estimators and the optimality does not require distributional assumptions. The estimator has a...
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作者：Frick, Mira; Iijima, Ryota; Ishii, Yuhta
作者单位：Princeton University; Pennsylvania Commonwealth System of Higher Education (PCSHE); Pennsylvania State University; Pennsylvania State University - University Park
摘要：A multi-product monopolist faces a buyer who is privately informed about his valuations for the goods. As is well known, optimal mechanisms are in general complicated, while simple mechanisms-such as pure bundling or separate sales-can be far from optimal and do not admit clear-cut comparisons. We show that this changes if the monopolist has sufficiently precise information about the buyer's valuations: Now, pure bundling always outperforms separate sales; moreover, there is a sense in which p...
