Multidimensional Screening With Precise Seller Information

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Frick, Mira; Iijima, Ryota; Ishii, Yuhta
• 署名单位: Princeton University; Pennsylvania Commonwealth System of Higher Education (PCSHE); Pennsylvania State University; Pennsylvania State University - University Park
• 刊物名称: ECONOMETRICA
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0012-9682
• DOI: 10.3982/ECTA23622
• 发表日期: 2026
• 关键词: Revenue maximization; mechanism design; GOODS; approximation; Robustness; monopoly

摘要

A multi-product monopolist faces a buyer who is privately informed about his valuations for the goods. As is well known, optimal mechanisms are in general complicated, while simple mechanisms-such as pure bundling or separate sales-can be far from optimal and do not admit clear-cut comparisons. We show that this changes if the monopolist has sufficiently precise information about the buyer's valuations: Now, pure bundling always outperforms separate sales; moreover, there is a sense in which pure bundling performs essentially as well as the optimal mechanism. To formalize this, we characterize how fast the corresponding revenues converge to the first-best revenue as the monopolist's information grows precise: Pure bundling achieves the same convergence rate to the first-best as optimal mechanisms; in contrast, the convergence rate under separate sales is suboptimal.