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作者：Cripps, MW; Swinkels, JM
作者单位：Washington University (WUSTL)
摘要：We consider large double auctions with private values. Values need be neither symmetric nor independent. Multiple units may be owned or desired. Participation may be stochastic. We introduce a very mild notion of a little independence. We prove that all nontrivial equilibria of auctions that satisfy this notion are asymptotically efficient. For any alpha > 0, inefficiency disappears at rate 1/n(2-alpha).
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作者：Gul, F; Pesendorfer, W
作者单位：Princeton University
摘要：We develop and analyze a model of random choice and random expected utility. A decision problem is a finite set of lotteries that describe the feasible choices. A random choice rule associates with each decision problem a probability measure over choices. A random utility function is a probability measure over von Neumann-Morgenstern utility functions. We show that a random choice rule maximizes some random utility function if and only if it is mixture continuous, monotone (the probability tha...
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作者：Mahajan, A
作者单位：Stanford University
摘要：This paper studies the problem of identification and estimation in nonparametric regression models with a misclassified binary regressor where the measurement error may be correlated with the regressors. We show that the regression function is nonparametrically identified in the presence of an additional random variable that is correlated with the unobserved true underlying variable but unrelated to the measurement error. Identification for serniparametric and parametric regression functions f...
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作者：Athey, S; Imbens, GW
作者单位：Stanford University; National Bureau of Economic Research; University of California System; University of California Berkeley; University of California System; University of California Berkeley
摘要：This paper develops a generalization of the widely used difference-in-differences method for evaluating the effects of policy changes. We propose a model that allows the control and treatment groups to have different average benefits from the treatment. The assumptions of the proposed model are invariant to the scaling of the Outcome. We provide conditions under which the model is nonparametrically identified and propose an estimator that can be applied using either repeated cross section or p...
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作者：Ballester, Coralio; Calvo-Armengol, Antoni; Zenou, Yves
作者单位：Universitat d'Alacant; Autonomous University of Barcelona; ICREA; Research Institute of Industrial Economics (IFN); Le Mans Universite
摘要：Finite population noncooperative games with linear-quadratic utilities, where each player decides how much action she exerts, can be interpreted as a network game with local payoff complementarities, together with a globally uniform payoff substitutability component and an own-concavity effect. For these games, the Nash equilibrium action of each player is proportional to her Bonacich centrality in the network of local complementarities, thus establishing a bridge with the sociology literature...
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作者：Benkard, C. Lanier; Berry, Steven
作者单位：Stanford University; Yale University
摘要：This note revisits the identification theorems of Brown (1983) and Roehrig (1988). We describe an error in the proofs of the main identification theorems in these papers, and provide an important counterexample to the theorems on the identification of the reduced form. Specifically, the reduced form of a nonseparable simultaneous equations model is not identified even under the assumptions of these papers. We provide conditions under which the reduced form is identified and is recoverable usin...
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作者：Wilcox, Nathaniel T.
作者单位：University of Houston System; University of Houston
摘要：Comparisons of learning models in repeated games have been a central preoccupation of experimental and behavioral economics over the last decade. Much of this work begins with pooled estimation of the model(s) under scrutiny. I show that in the presence of parameter heterogeneity, pooled estimation can produce a severe bias that tends to unduly favor reinforcement learning relative to belief learning. This occurs when comparisons are based on goodness of fit and when comparisons are based on t...
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作者：Atakan, AE
作者单位：Northwestern University
摘要：In this paper, I analyze a decentralized search and matching economy with transferable utility composed of heterogeneous agents. I explore whether Becker's assortative matching result generalizes to an economy where agents engage in costly search. In an economy with explicit additive search costs, complementarities in joint production (supermodularity of the joint production function) lead to assortative matching. This is in contrast to previous literature, which had shown that in a search eco...
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作者：Garrat, R; Tröger, T
作者单位：University of California System; University of California Santa Barbara; University of Bonn
摘要：In standard auctions resale creates a role for a speculator-a bidder who is commonly known to have no use value for the good on sale. We study this issue in environments with symmetric independent private-value bidders. For second-price and English auctions the efficient value-bidding equilibrium coexists with a continuum of inefficient equilibria in which the speculator wins the auction and makes positive profits. First-price and Dutch auctions have an essentially unique equilibrium, and whet...
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作者：Andrews, DWK; Moreira, MJ; Stock, JH
作者单位：Yale University; Harvard University
摘要：This paper considers tests of the parameter on an endogenous variable in an instrumental variables regression model. The focus is on determining tests that have some optimal power properties. We start by considering a model with normally distributed errors and known error covariance matrix. We consider tests that are similar and satisfy a natural rotational invariance condition. We determine a two-sided power envelope for invariant similar tests. This allows us to assess and compare the power ...
