Efficiency of large double auctions

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Cripps, MW; Swinkels, JM
• 署名单位: Washington University (WUSTL)
• 刊物名称: ECONOMETRICA
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0012-9682
• DOI: 10.1111/j.1468-0262.2006.00649.x
• 发表日期: 2006
• 页码: 47-92
• 关键词: private value auctions; incomplete information; simple market; CONVERGENCE

摘要

We consider large double auctions with private values. Values need be neither symmetric nor independent. Multiple units may be owned or desired. Participation may be stochastic. We introduce a very mild notion of a little independence. We prove that all nontrivial equilibria of auctions that satisfy this notion are asymptotically efficient. For any alpha > 0, inefficiency disappears at rate 1/n(2-alpha).