Speculation in standard auctions with resale

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Garrat, R; Tröger, T
• 署名单位: University of California System; University of California Santa Barbara; University of Bonn
• 刊物名称: ECONOMETRICA
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0012-9682
• DOI: 10.1111/j.1468-0262.2006.00681.x
• 发表日期: 2006
• 页码: 753-769
• 关键词: opportunities; price

摘要

In standard auctions resale creates a role for a speculator-a bidder who is commonly known to have no use value for the good on sale. We study this issue in environments with symmetric independent private-value bidders. For second-price and English auctions the efficient value-bidding equilibrium coexists with a continuum of inefficient equilibria in which the speculator wins the auction and makes positive profits. First-price and Dutch auctions have an essentially unique equilibrium, and whether or not the speculator wins the auction and distorts the final allocation depends on the number of bidders, the Value distribution, and the discount factor. Speculators do not make profits in first-price or Dutch auctions.