Who's who in networks.: Wanted:: The key player
成果类型：
Article
署名作者：
Ballester, Coralio; Calvo-Armengol, Antoni; Zenou, Yves
署名单位：
Universitat d'Alacant; Autonomous University of Barcelona; ICREA; Research Institute of Industrial Economics (IFN); Le Mans Universite
刊物名称：
ECONOMETRICA
ISSN/ISSBN：
0012-9682
DOI：
10.1111/j.1468-0262.2006.00709.x
发表日期：
2006
页码：
1403-1417
关键词：
摘要：
Finite population noncooperative games with linear-quadratic utilities, where each player decides how much action she exerts, can be interpreted as a network game with local payoff complementarities, together with a globally uniform payoff substitutability component and an own-concavity effect. For these games, the Nash equilibrium action of each player is proportional to her Bonacich centrality in the network of local complementarities, thus establishing a bridge with the sociology literature on social networks. This Bonacich-Nash linkage implies that aggregate equilibrium increases with network size and density. We then analyze a policy that consists of targeting the key player, that is, the player who, once removed, leads to the optimal change in aggregate activity. We provide a geometric characterization of the key player identified with an intercentrality measure, which takes into account both a player's centrality and her contribution to the centrality of the others.
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