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作者：Amador, M; Werning, I; Angeletos, GM
作者单位：Stanford University; Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT)
摘要：We study the optimal trade-off between commitment and flexibility in a consumption-savings model. Individuals expect to receive relevant information regarding tastes and thus they value the flexibility provided by larger choice sets. On the other hand, they also expect to suffer from temptation, with or without self-control, and thus they value the commitment afforded by smaller choice sets. The optimal commitment problem we study is to find the best subset of the individual's budget set. This...
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作者：Angrist, J; Chernozhukov, V; Fernández-Val, I
作者单位：Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT); Boston University
摘要：Quantile regression (QR) fits a linear model for conditional quantiles just as ordinary least squares (OLS) fits a linear model for conditional means. An attractive feature of OLS is that it gives the minimum mean-squared error linear approximation to the conditional expectation function even when the linear model is misspecified. Empirical research using quantile regression with discrete covariates suggests that QR may have a similar property, but the exact nature of the linear approximation ...
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作者：Charness, Gary; Dufwenberg, Martin
作者单位：University of California System; University of California Santa Barbara; University of Arizona; University of Arizona
摘要：We examine experimentally the impact of communication on trust and cooperation. Our design admits observation of promises, lies, and beliefs. The evidence is consistent with people striving to live up to others' expectations so as to avoid guilt, as can be modeled using psychological game theory. When players exhibit such guilt aversion, communication may influence motivation and behavior by influencing beliefs about beliefs. Promises may enhance trustworthy behavior, which is what we observe....
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作者：Che, Yeon-Koo; Kim, Jinwoo
作者单位：Columbia University; University of Wisconsin System; University of Wisconsin Madison; Yonsei University
摘要：A contract with multiple agents may be susceptible to collusion. We show that agents' collusion imposes no cost in a large class of circumstances with risk neutral agents, including both uncorrelated and correlated types. In those circumstances, any payoff the principal can attain in the absence of collusion, including the second-best level, can be attained in the presence of collusion in a way robust to many aspects of collusion behavior. The collusion-proof implementation generalizes to a se...
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作者：Deneckere, Raymond; Liang, Meng-Yu
作者单位：University of Wisconsin System; University of Wisconsin Madison; Academia Sinica - Taiwan
摘要：A seller and a buyer bargain over the terms of trade for an object. The seller receives a perfect signal that determines the value of the object to both players, whereas the buyer remains uninformed. We analyze the infinite-horizon bargaining game in which the buyer makes all the offers. When the static incentive constraints permit first-best efficiency, then under some regularity conditions the outcome of the sequential bargaining game becomes arbitrarily efficient as bargaining frictions van...
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作者：Small, KA; Winston, C; Yan, J
作者单位：University of California System; University of California Irvine; Brookings Institution; Hong Kong Polytechnic University
摘要：We apply recent econometric advances to study the distribution of commuters' preferences for speedy and reliable highway travel. Our analysis applies mixed logit to combined revealed and stated preference data on commuter choices of whether to pay a toll for congestion-free express travel. We find that motorists exhibit high values of travel time and reliability, and substantial heterogeneity in those values. We suggest that road pricing policies designed to cater to such varying preferences c...
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作者：Chernozhukov, V; Hansen, C
作者单位：Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT); University of Chicago
摘要：The ability of quantile regression models to characterize the heterogeneous impact of variables on different points of an outcome distribution makes them appealing in many economic applications. However, in observational studies, the variables of interest (e.g., education, prices) are often endogenous, making conventional quantile regression inconsistent and hence inappropriate for recovering the causal effects of these variables on the quantiles of economic outcomes. In order to address this ...
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作者：Nöldeke, G; Samuelson, L
作者单位：University of Bonn; University of Wisconsin System; University of Wisconsin Madison
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作者：Sprumont, Y
作者单位：Universite de Montreal; Universite de Montreal
摘要：Each agent in a finite set requests an integer quantity of an idiosyncratic good; the resulting total cost must be shared among the participating agents. The Aumann-Shapley prices are given by the Shapley value of the game where each unit of each good is regarded as a distinct player. The Aumann-Shapley cost-sharing method charges to an agent the sum of the prices attached to the units she consumes. We show that this method is characterized by the two standard axioms of Additivity and Dummy, a...
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作者：Rocheteau, G; Wright, R
作者单位：Federal Reserve System - USA; Federal Reserve Bank - Cleveland; Australian National University; University of Pennsylvania
摘要：We compare three market structures for monetary economies: bargaining (search equilibrium); price taking (competitive equilibrium); and price posting (competitive search equilibrium). We also extend work on the microfoundations of money by allowing a general matching technology and entry. We study how equilibrium and the effects of policy depend on market structure. Under bargaining, trade and entry are both inefficient, and inflation implies first-order welfare losses. Under price taking, the...
