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作者:Card, David
作者单位:University of California System; University of California Berkeley; National Bureau of Economic Research
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作者:Daly, George
作者单位:Georgetown University
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作者:Walsh, Elias; Dolfin, Sarah; Dinardo, John
作者单位:University of Michigan System; University of Michigan; University of Michigan System; University of Michigan; Mathematica
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作者:Ho, Teck-Hua; Su, Xuanming
作者单位:University of California System; University of California Berkeley
摘要:People exhibit peer-induced fairness concerns when they look to their peers as a reference to evaluate their endowments. We analyze two independent ultimatum games played sequentially by a leader and two followers. With peer-induced fairness, the second follower is averse to receiving less than the first follower. Using laboratory experimental data, we estimate that peer-induced fairness between followers is two times stronger than distributional fairness between leader and follower. Allowing ...
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作者:Oberholzer-Gee, Felix; Waldfogel, Joel
作者单位:Harvard University; University of Pennsylvania
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作者:Bergstrom, Theodore C.; Garratt, Rodney T.; Sheehan-Connor, Damien
作者单位:University of California System; University of California Santa Barbara; Wesleyan University
摘要:Stem cell transplants save lives of many patients with blood diseases. Donation is painful, but rarely has lasting adverse effects. Patients can accept transplants only from donors with compatible immune systems. Those lacking a sibling match must seek donations from the general population. The probability that two unrelated persons are compatible is less than 1/10,000. Health authorities maintain a registry of several million genetically tested potential donors who agree to donate if asked. W...
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作者:Palumbo, Michael G.; Parker, Jonathan A.
作者单位:Federal Reserve System - USA; Federal Reserve System Board of Governors; Northwestern University
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作者:Grubb, Michael D.
作者单位:Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT)
摘要:Consumers may overestimate the precision of their demand forecasts. This overconfidence creates an incentive for both monopolists and competitive firms to offer tariffs with included quantities at zero marginal cost, followed by steep marginal charges. This matches observed cellular phone service pricing plans in the United States and elsewhere. An alternative explanation with common priors can be ruled out in favor of overconfidence based on observed customer usage patterns for a major US cel...
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作者:Bertrand, Marianne; Schanzenbach, Diane Whitmore
作者单位:University of Chicago; University of Chicago
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作者:Mishkin, Frederic S.
作者单位:Columbia University; National Bureau of Economic Research