Peer-Induced Fairness in Games

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Ho, Teck-Hua; Su, Xuanming
• 署名单位: University of California System; University of California Berkeley
• 刊物名称: AMERICAN ECONOMIC REVIEW
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0002-8282
• DOI: 10.1257/aer.99.5.2022
• 发表日期: 2009
• 页码: 2022-2049
• 关键词: BOUNDEDLY RATIONAL CUSTOMERS; BEHAVIOR; PSYCHOLOGY; CONTRACTS

摘要

People exhibit peer-induced fairness concerns when they look to their peers as a reference to evaluate their endowments. We analyze two independent ultimatum games played sequentially by a leader and two followers. With peer-induced fairness, the second follower is averse to receiving less than the first follower. Using laboratory experimental data, we estimate that peer-induced fairness between followers is two times stronger than distributional fairness between leader and follower. Allowing for heterogeneity, we find that 50 percent of subjects are fairness-minded. We discuss how peer-induced fairness might limit price discrimination, account for low variability in CEO compensation, and explain pattern bargaining.