One Chance in a Million: Altruism and the Bone Marrow Registry

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Bergstrom, Theodore C.; Garratt, Rodney T.; Sheehan-Connor, Damien
• 署名单位: University of California System; University of California Santa Barbara; Wesleyan University
• 刊物名称: AMERICAN ECONOMIC REVIEW
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0002-8282
• DOI: 10.1257/aer.99.4.1309
• 发表日期: 2009
• 页码: 1309-1334
• 关键词: ACUTE LYMPHOBLASTIC-LEUKEMIA; acute myeloid-leukemia; STEM-CELL DONORS; UNRELATED DONOR; hla-c; transplantation; program; LIFE; chemotherapy; incentives

摘要

Stem cell transplants save lives of many patients with blood diseases. Donation is painful, but rarely has lasting adverse effects. Patients can accept transplants only from donors with compatible immune systems. Those lacking a sibling match must seek donations from the general population. The probability that two unrelated persons are compatible is less than 1/10,000. Health authorities maintain a registry of several million genetically tested potential donors who agree to donate if asked. We fund that the benefits of adding registrants of every race exceed costs. We also explore the peculiar structure of voluntary public good provision that faces potential donors. (JEL D64, H41, I11)