Teacher Quality Policy When Supply Matters

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Rothstein, Jesse
• 署名单位: University of California System; University of California Berkeley; University of California System; University of California Berkeley
• 刊物名称: AMERICAN ECONOMIC REVIEW
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0002-8282
• DOI: 10.1257/aer.20121242
• 发表日期: 2015
• 页码: 100-130
• 关键词: incentive contracts; performance pay; schools; would; classroom; salaries; outcomes; impacts; DESIGN

摘要

Teacher contracts that condition pay and retention on demonstrated performance can improve selection into and out of teaching. I study alternative contracts in a simulated teacher labor market that incorporates dynamic self-selection and Bayesian learning. Bonus policies create only modest incentives and thus have small effects on selection. Reductions in tenure rates can have larger effects, but must be accompanied by substantial salary increases; elimination of tenure confers little additional benefit unless firing rates are extremely high. Benefits of both bonus and tenure policies exceed costs, though optimal policies are sensitive to labor market parameters about which little is known.