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作者：Lucas, Robert E., Jr.
作者单位：University of Chicago
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作者：Piketty, Thomas
作者单位：Paris School of Economics
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作者：Saito, Kota
作者单位：California Institute of Technology
摘要：An uncertainty-averse agent prefers betting on an event whose probability is known, to betting on an event whose probability is unknown. Such an agent may randomize his choices to eliminate the effects of uncertainty. For what sort of preferences does a randomization eliminate the effects of uncertainty? To answer this question, we investigate an agent's preferences over sets of acts. We axiomatize a utility function, through which we can identify the agent's subjective belief that a randomiza...
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作者：Cicala, Steve
作者单位：University of Chicago
摘要：This paper evaluates changes in fuel procurement practices by coal -and gas-fired power plants in the United States following state-level legislation that ended cost-of-service regulation of electricity generation. I find that deregulated plants substantially reduce the price paid for coal (but not gas) and tend to employ less capital-intensive sulfur abatement techniques relative to matched plants that were not subject to any regulatory change. Deregulation also led to a shift toward more pro...
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作者：Grubb, Michael D.; Osborne, Matthew
作者单位：Boston College; University of Toronto; University of Toronto
摘要：Following FCC pressure to end bill shock, cellular carriers now alert customers when they exceed usage allowances. We estimate a model of plan choice, usage, and learning using a 2002-2004 panel of cellular bills. Accounting for firm price adjustment, we predict that implementing alerts in 2002-2004 would have lowered average annual consumer welfare by $33. We show that consumers are inattentive to past usage, meaning that bill-shock alerts are informative. Additionally, our estimates imply th...
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作者：Di Tella, Rafael; Perez-Truglia, Ricardo; Babino, Andres; Sigman, Mariano
作者单位：Harvard University; Microsoft; University of Buenos Aires; University of Buenos Aires; Universidad Torcuato Di Tella
摘要：We present results from a corruption game (a dictator game modified so that recipients can take a side payment in exchange for accepting a reduction in the overall size of the pie). Dictators (silently) treated to be able to take more of the recipient's tokens, took more of them. They were also more likely to believe that recipients had accepted side payments, even if there was a prize for accuracy. The results favor the hypothesis that people avoid altruistic actions by distorting beliefs abo...
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作者：Handel, Benjamin R.; Kolstad, Jonathan T.
作者单位：University of California System; University of California Berkeley; University of California System; University of California Berkeley
摘要：Traditional models of insurance choice are predicated on fully informed and rational consumers protecting themselves from exposure to financial risk. In practice, choosing an insurance plan is a complicated decision often made without full information. In this paper we combine new administrative data on health plan choices and claims with unique survey data on consumer information to identify risk preferences, information frictions, and hassle costs. Our additional friction measures are import...
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作者：Anderson, Siwan; Francois, Patrick; Kotwal, Ashok
作者单位：University of British Columbia; Canadian Institute for Advanced Research (CIFAR)
摘要：We study the operation of local governments (Panchayats) in rural Maharashtra, India, using a survey that we designed for this end. Elections are freely contested, fairly tallied, highly participatory, non-coerced, and lead to appointment of representative politicians. However, beneath this veneer of ideal democracy we find evidence of deeply ingrained clientelist vote-trading structures maintained through extra-political means. Elite minorities undermine policies that would redistribute incom...
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作者：Gennaioli, Nicola; Shleifer, Andrei; Vishny, Robert
作者单位：Bocconi University; Harvard University; University of Chicago
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作者：Newell, Richard G.; Siikamaeki, Juha
作者单位：Duke University; Resources for the Future
