Clientelism in Indian Villages

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Anderson, Siwan; Francois, Patrick; Kotwal, Ashok
• 署名单位: University of British Columbia; Canadian Institute for Advanced Research (CIFAR)
• 刊物名称: AMERICAN ECONOMIC REVIEW
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0002-8282
• DOI: 10.1257/aer.20130623
• 发表日期: 2015
• 页码: 1780-1816
• 关键词: economic-development; POWER; culture; origins

摘要

We study the operation of local governments (Panchayats) in rural Maharashtra, India, using a survey that we designed for this end. Elections are freely contested, fairly tallied, highly participatory, non-coerced, and lead to appointment of representative politicians. However, beneath this veneer of ideal democracy we find evidence of deeply ingrained clientelist vote-trading structures maintained through extra-political means. Elite minorities undermine policies that would redistribute income toward the majority poor. We explore the means by which elites use their dominance of land ownership and traditional social superiority to achieve political control in light of successful majoritarian institutional reforms. (JEL D72, H23, I38, J15, O15, O17, O18)