Conveniently Upset: Avoiding Altruism by Distorting Beliefs about Others' Altruism

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Di Tella, Rafael; Perez-Truglia, Ricardo; Babino, Andres; Sigman, Mariano
• 署名单位: Harvard University; Microsoft; University of Buenos Aires; University of Buenos Aires; Universidad Torcuato Di Tella
• 刊物名称: AMERICAN ECONOMIC REVIEW
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0002-8282
• DOI: 10.1257/aer.20141409
• 发表日期: 2015
• 页码: 3416-3442
• 关键词: cognitive-dissonance; Dictator games; redistributive politics; ELASTIC JUSTIFICATION; social preferences; REGARDING BEHAVIOR; PROPERTY-RIGHTS; self-interest; fairness; RECIPROCITY

摘要

We present results from a corruption game (a dictator game modified so that recipients can take a side payment in exchange for accepting a reduction in the overall size of the pie). Dictators (silently) treated to be able to take more of the recipient's tokens, took more of them. They were also more likely to believe that recipients had accepted side payments, even if there was a prize for accuracy. The results favor the hypothesis that people avoid altruistic actions by distorting beliefs about others' altruism.