Health Insurance for Humans: Information Frictions, Plan Choice, and Consumer Welfare

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Handel, Benjamin R.; Kolstad, Jonathan T.
• 署名单位: University of California System; University of California Berkeley; University of California System; University of California Berkeley
• 刊物名称: AMERICAN ECONOMIC REVIEW
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0002-8282
• DOI: 10.1257/aer.20131126
• 发表日期: 2015
• 页码: 2449-2500
• 关键词: Asymmetric information; risk preferences; selection; MARKETS; inertia

摘要

Traditional models of insurance choice are predicated on fully informed and rational consumers protecting themselves from exposure to financial risk. In practice, choosing an insurance plan is a complicated decision often made without full information. In this paper we combine new administrative data on health plan choices and claims with unique survey data on consumer information to identify risk preferences, information frictions, and hassle costs. Our additional friction measures are important predictors of choices and meaningfully impact risk preference estimates. We study the implications of counterfactual insurance allocations to illustrate the importance of distinguishing between these micro-foundations for welfare analysis. (JEL D81, D8 3, G22, I13)