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作者：Ellison, Glenn; Ellison, Sara Fisher
作者单位：Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT); Paris School of Economics
摘要：This article examines effects of internet search technologies on match-quality markets. A model in which sellers of unusual objects wait for high-value buyers illustrates how more efficient search may simultaneously increase price levels, price dispersion, and social welfare. A reduced-form analysis of the used-book market finds support for several nuanced model predictions. Estimates from a novel structural framework indicate the shift to online sales more than doubled social welfare, with ga...
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作者：Seim, Katja; Vitorino, Maria Ana
作者单位：Center for Economic & Policy Research (CEPR); Yale University; National Bureau of Economic Research; INSEAD Business School
摘要：This article empirically examines the drip pricing behavior of firms, where consumers purchase a base product and may later buy an add-on, often without anticipating the need for it. A loss leader pricing strategy emerges, with firms pricing the base product below, and the add-on above, standalone levels. Using data from the Portuguese driving instruction market, we find that base course prices decrease with competition, while prices for add-on repeat courses do not. A survey reveals that at l...
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作者：Rottner, Claudio
作者单位：University of Bayreuth
摘要：This article investigates a multi-unit pay-as-bid procurement auction where the auctioneer fixes total spending and maximizes the quantity procured with their predetermined, secret budget. Previous literature has analyzed fixed-quantity auctions, where the traded quantity is fixed but unknown to the bidders. Compared to such auctions, budget auctions lower the auctioneer's costs by introducing an additional interaction between a bidder's bids; bidders not only weigh a higher profit margin on a...
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作者：Schmidt-Dengler, Philipp
作者单位：University of Vienna; Centre for Economic Policy Research - UK
摘要：This paper studies the adoption of nuclear magnetic resonance imaging (MRI) by US hospitals. I consider a timing game of new technology adoption. The dynamic game takes timing decisions and strategic interaction into account. Using a panel data set of US hospitals, cross sectional variation in adoption times, market structure and demand is exploited to recover the profit and cost parameters. In counterfactuals, I quantify to what extent the timing of adoption is caused by a preemptive motive. ...
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作者：Rey, Patrick; Spiegel, Yossi; Stahl, Konrad
作者单位：Communaute d'universites et etablissements de Toulouse (Comue); Universite Toulouse 1 Capitole; Toulouse School of Economics; Tel Aviv University; Leibniz Association; University of Mannheim; Ifo Institut; Leibniz Association; Zentrum fur Europaische Wirtschaftsforschung (ZEW)
摘要：We study the feasibility and profitability of predation in a dynamic environment, using a parsimonious infinite-horizon, complete information setting in which an incumbent repeatedly faces potential entry. When a rival enters, the incumbent chooses whether to accommodate or predate it; the entrant then decides whether to stay or exit. We show that there always exists a Markov perfect equilibrium, which can be of three types: accommodation, monopolization, and recurrent predation. We then analy...
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作者：Tan, Teck Yong
作者单位：University of Rochester
摘要：I study the implications of data privacy when consumers' outside options are endogenously determined by their efforts. Data control refers to consumers' ability to opt out of data collection on their efforts. Data disclosure rate refers to the likelihood that the collected data are shared with a monopolist. I examine their differences and consider how their interplay affects welfare. Without data control, the data disclosure rate affects the monopolist's profit nonmonotonically but has no impa...
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作者：Lemus, Jorge; Marshall, Guillermo
作者单位：University of Illinois System; University of Illinois Urbana-Champaign; University of British Columbia
摘要：Firms and government agencies increasingly use online contests to find solutions to problems. These contests allow players to make multiple attempts, and their progress is tracked on a real-time public leaderboard. Although the contests are dynamic, contest sponsors miss the opportunity to dynamically shape players' incentives, as they award the entire prize pool based only on players' final rankings. We propose the use of contingent prizes that depend on the game's history to incentivize play...
