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作者：Xu, Boli
作者单位：University of Iowa
摘要：We study dynamic partnerships where the output evolves stochastically, each player can exit at any time, and players who have exited continue to accrue some benefits if the remaining players keep contributing to the partnership. Players can strategically exit to free-ride on their partners' contributions, knowing that it may trigger subsequent exits of their partners. We characterize the unique Pareto-optimal equilibrium. When players have sufficiently large free-riding incentives and a medium...
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作者：Liao, Xiaoye; Szkup, Michal
作者单位：University of British Columbia
摘要：We investigate how differences in initial beliefs and sequential information choices affect the likelihood of coordination failure. To do so, we embed interim information acquisition (i.e., information acquisition after observing initial private information) into a standard global game mode with a normal information structure and improper prior. We find that the likelihood of coordination on welfare-inferior equilibrium is invariant to precision, cost, and availability of information. We show ...
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作者：Kartik, Navin; Zhong, Weijie
作者单位：Yale University; Stanford University
摘要：A seller posts a price for a single object. The seller's and buyer's values may be interdependent. We characterize the set of payoff vectors across all information structures. Simple feasibility and individual-rationality constraints identify the payoff set. The buyer can obtain the entire surplus; often, noninformational mechanisms cannot enlarge the payoff set. We also study payoffs when the buyer is more informed than the seller, and when the buyer is fully informed. All three payoff sets c...
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作者：Kamada, Yuichiro; Kojima, Fuhito
作者单位：University of California System; University of California Berkeley; University of Tokyo
摘要：Matching markets are often fragmented, organized at a small local level. While integration of matching markets may lead to welfare gains by expanding choice, it may also harm some market participants by increasing competition for the same resources. We show that every good mechanism fails the monotonicity requirement that no individuals be hurt by integration. Then we provide characterization results that identify conditions under which monotonicity becomes compatible with other desirable prop...
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作者：Battaglini, Marco
作者单位：Cornell University
摘要：We analyze the existence of equilibria with complex dynamics in a policy framework with time inconsistency. We consider an economy where, in each period, the policy maker in power determines the level of a durable public good (or bad) that creates strategic linkages across policy periods. When the decision-making process is time consistent-such as when a benevolent planner sets policy in every period-the economy exhibits a unique equilibrium where the state converges to a deterministic steady ...
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作者：Ben-porath, Elchanan; Dekel, Eddie; Lipman, Barton L.
作者单位：Hebrew University of Jerusalem; Hebrew University of Jerusalem; Northwestern University; Tel Aviv University; Boston University
摘要：We explore two interrelated models of hard information. In the evidence-acquisition model, an agent with private information searches for evidence to show the principal about her type. In the signal-choice model, a privately informed agent chooses an action generating a random signal whose realization may be correlated with her type. The signal-choice model is a special case, and as we show, under certain conditions, a reduced form of the evidence-acquisition model. We develop tools for charac...
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作者：Jacobovic, Royi; Levy, Yehuda John; Solan, Eilon
作者单位：Tel Aviv University; University of Glasgow
摘要：A Bayesian game is said to have nested information if the players are ordered and each player knows the types of all players that follow her in that order. We prove that all multiplayer Bayesian games with finite action spaces, bounded payoffs, Polish type spaces, and nested information admit a Bayesian equilibrium.
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作者：Moeller, Markus
作者单位：University of Bonn
摘要：In the standard one-to-one agent-object matching model, I consider a central matching authority that publicly announces a strategy-proof mechanism and then initiates a matching. Following Akbarpour and Li (2020), the authority's commitment to the announced mechanism is limited to mechanisms rendering participants' observations indistinguishable from it. I call an announced mechanism transparent if any deviation from it would be detected.The main findings identify trade-offs regarding transpare...
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作者：Antler, Yair; Bachi, Benjamin
作者单位：Tel Aviv University; University of Haifa
摘要：We develop a model of non-Bayesian decision-making in which an agent obtains a signal about a relevant economic fundamental and subsequently takes an action. To interpret the signal, the agent calibrates a simple prediction rule based on a data set that consists of previous signals and state realizations. Her subsequent action affects the probability with which the current signal and the corresponding state realization will be observed and recorded in the data set that will be used in future d...
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作者：Lehrer, Ehud; Shaiderman, Dimitry
作者单位：Durham University; Hebrew University of Jerusalem
摘要：In the classical Bayesian persuasion model, an informed player and an uninformed one engage in a static interaction. This work extends this classical model to a dynamic setting where the state of nature evolves according to a Markovian law, allowing for a more realistic representation of real-world situations where the state of nature evolves over time. In this repeated persuasion model, an optimal disclosure strategy of the sender must balance between obtaining a high-stage payoff and disclos...
