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作者:Gao, Pingyang; Liang, Pierre Jinghong
作者单位:University of Chicago; Carnegie Mellon University
摘要:Faceless trading in a secondary stock market not only redistributes wealth among investors but also generates information that feeds back to real decisions. Using this observation we re-evaluate the leveling-the-playing-field rationale for disclosure to secondary stock markets. By partially preempting traders' information advantage established from information acquisition, disclosure reduces private incentives to acquire information, resulting in two opposite effects on firm value. On one hand...
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作者:Maas, Victor S.; Van Rinsum, Marcel
作者单位:Erasmus University Rotterdam; Erasmus University Rotterdam - Excl Erasmus MC; Erasmus University Rotterdam; Erasmus University Rotterdam - Excl Erasmus MC
摘要:This paper investigates reporting honesty when managers have monetary incentives to overstate their performance. We argue that managers who report about their performance will take into account how their report affects their peers (i.e., other managers at the same hierarchical level). This effect depends on the design of the organization's control system, in particular, on the reward structure and the information policy regarding individual performance reports. The reward structure determines ...
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作者:Bischof, Jannis; Daske, Holger
作者单位:University of Mannheim
摘要:We use the EU stress tests and the Eurozone sovereign debt crisis to study the consequences of supervisory disclosure of banks' sovereign risk exposures. We test the idea that a mandatory one-time disclosure induces an increase in voluntary disclosures about sovereign risk in the following periods and, through the shift in the voluntary disclosure equilibrium, increases the liquidity of banks' shares. First, we find that the timing and content of different mandatory disclosure events helps exp...
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作者:Ertimur, Yonca; Ferri, Fabrizio; Oesch, David
作者单位:University of Colorado System; University of Colorado Boulder; Columbia University; University of St Gallen
摘要:We investigate the economic role of proxy advisors (PAs) in the context of mandatory say on pay votes, a novel and complex item requiring significant firm-specific analysis. PAs are more likely to issue an Against recommendation at firms with poor performance and higher levels of CEO pay and do not appear to follow a one-size-fits-all approach. PAs' recommendations are the key determinant of voting outcome but the sensitivity of shareholder votes to these recommendations varies with the instit...
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作者:Grabner, Isabella; Moers, Frank
作者单位:Maastricht University
摘要:In this study, we investigate the choice of performance measures in promotion decisions. In particular, we examine the extent to which managers incorporate different performance measures for different types of job assignment. Based on a simple theoretical framework, we predict that, in making promotion decisions, the weight on current job performance decreases with increases in the change in tasks upon promotion, while the weight on subjective assessments of ability increases. This result basi...
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作者:Granja, Joao
作者单位:Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT)
摘要:This study examines the impact of disclosure requirements on the resolution costs of failed banks. Consistent with the hypothesis that disclosure requirements mitigate information asymmetries in the auctions for failed banks, I find that, when failed banks are subject to more comprehensive disclosure requirements, regulators incur lower costs of closing a bank and retain a lower portion of the failed bank's assets, while bidders that are geographically more distant are more likely to participa...
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作者:Robinson, Leslie A.; Stocken, Phillip C.
摘要:Using U.S.-based multinational firm data gathered over more than two decades, we examine factors associated with the location of decision rights within these firms, whether the inappropriate assignment of decision rights is associated with poor firm performance, and whether these firms relocate decision rights in response to their evolving environments. We find that a mismatch between the location of decision rights and a firm's environment is associated with weak firm performance. We also sho...
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作者:Armstrong, Christopher S.; Gow, Ian D.; Larcker, David F.
作者单位:University of Pennsylvania; Harvard University; Stanford University
摘要:This study examines the effects of shareholder support for equity compensation plans on subsequent CEO compensation. Using cross-sectional regression, instrumental variable, and regression discontinuity research designs, we find little evidence that either lower shareholder voting support for, or outright rejection of, proposed equity compensation plans leads to decreases in the level or composition of future CEO incentive compensation. We also find that, in cases where the equity compensation...
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作者:Ball, Ray; Kothari, S. P.; Nikolaev, Valeri V.
作者单位:University of Chicago; Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT)
摘要:A substantial literature investigates conditional conservatism, defined as asymmetric accounting recognition of economic shocks (news), and how it depends on various market, political, and institutional variables. Studies typically assume the Basu [1997] asymmetric timeliness coefficient (the incremental slope on negative returns in a piecewise-linear regression of accounting income on stock returns) is a valid conditional conservatism measure. We analyze the measure's validity, in the context...
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作者:Qu, Hong
作者单位:Pennsylvania Commonwealth System of Higher Education (PCSHE); Pennsylvania State University; Pennsylvania State University - University Park
摘要:In many scenarios such as banking and liquidity crises, inefficiencies often arise because investors face uncertainties about economic fundamentals and the strategies of other investors. How information affects fundamental uncertainty is well studied, but how information affects strategic uncertainty is underexplored. This paper examines how two communication mechanisms, market and cheap talk, affect investment decisions and efficiency in an experimental investment game with both fundamental a...