The Relation Between Bank Resolutions and Information Environment: Evidence from the Auctions for Failed Banks

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Granja, Joao
• 署名单位: Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT)
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF ACCOUNTING RESEARCH
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0021-8456
• DOI: 10.1111/1475-679X.12028
• 发表日期: 2013
• 页码: 1031-1070
• 关键词: depositor discipline; public information; winners curse; failures; COMPETITION; incentives; MARKET; FIRMS

摘要

This study examines the impact of disclosure requirements on the resolution costs of failed banks. Consistent with the hypothesis that disclosure requirements mitigate information asymmetries in the auctions for failed banks, I find that, when failed banks are subject to more comprehensive disclosure requirements, regulators incur lower costs of closing a bank and retain a lower portion of the failed bank's assets, while bidders that are geographically more distant are more likely to participate in the bidding for the failed bank. The paper provides new insights into the relation between disclosure and the reorganization of a banking system when the regulators' preferred plan of action is to promote the acquisition of undercapitalized banks by healthy ones. The results suggest that disclosure regulation policy influences the cost of resolution of a bank and, as a result, could be an important factor in the definition of the optimal resolution strategy during a banking crisis event.