How Do Market Prices and Cheap Talk Affect Coordination?

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Qu, Hong
• 署名单位: Pennsylvania Commonwealth System of Higher Education (PCSHE); Pennsylvania State University; Pennsylvania State University - University Park
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF ACCOUNTING RESEARCH
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0021-8456
• DOI: 10.1111/1475-679X.12020
• 发表日期: 2013
• 页码: 1221-1260
• 关键词: pre-play communication; rational-expectations; equilibrium selection; global games; INFORMATION; TRANSPARENCY; crises; aggregation; EFFICIENCY; FAILURE

摘要

In many scenarios such as banking and liquidity crises, inefficiencies often arise because investors face uncertainties about economic fundamentals and the strategies of other investors. How information affects fundamental uncertainty is well studied, but how information affects strategic uncertainty is underexplored. This paper examines how two communication mechanisms, market and cheap talk, affect investment decisions and efficiency in an experimental investment game with both fundamental and strategic uncertainty. I find that the market does not improve coordination because the expectation that coordination failures will occur is self-fulfilling, while cheap talk improves coordination because the signals of willingness to invest alleviate strategic uncertainty.