Informational Feedback, Adverse Selection, and Optimal Disclosure Policy

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Gao, Pingyang; Liang, Pierre Jinghong
• 署名单位: University of Chicago; Carnegie Mellon University
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF ACCOUNTING RESEARCH
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0021-8456
• DOI: 10.1111/1475-679X.12019
• 发表日期: 2013
• 页码: 1133-1158
• 关键词: market liquidity; INVESTMENT; price; EFFICIENCY; cost; COMPENSATION; COMPETITION; CONTRACTS; earnings; FIRMS

摘要

Faceless trading in a secondary stock market not only redistributes wealth among investors but also generates information that feeds back to real decisions. Using this observation we re-evaluate the leveling-the-playing-field rationale for disclosure to secondary stock markets. By partially preempting traders' information advantage established from information acquisition, disclosure reduces private incentives to acquire information, resulting in two opposite effects on firm value. On one hand, this narrows the information gap between informed and uninformed traders and improves liquidity of firm shares. On the other hand, this reduces the informational feedback from the stock market to real decisions. This tradeoff determines the optimal disclosure policy. The model explains why firm value can be higher in an environment that simultaneously promotes disclosure and private information production and why growth firms are endogenously more opaque than value firms.