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作者:Dhaliwal, Dan; Krull, Linda; Li, Oliver Zhen
作者单位:University of Arizona; University of Auckland; University of Texas System; University of Texas Austin; University of Notre Dame
摘要:The Jobs and Growth Tax Relief Reconciliation Act of 2003 reduced shareholder-level taxes on equity income. If shareholder-level taxation is a component of cost of equity capital, then the cost of equity capital should decrease after the Tax Act. We find that the cost of equity capital decreases by 1.02% and that the decline is smaller for firms largely held by institutional investors to whom the tax rate reduction does not apply. These results suggest that the Tax Act lowered the cost of equi...
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作者:Beaver, William; McNichols, Maureen; Price, Richard
作者单位:Stanford University; Rice University
摘要:We show that tests of market efficiency are sensitive to the inclusion of delisting firm-years. When included, trading strategy returns based on anomaly variables can increase (for strategies based on earnings, cash flows and the book-to-market ratio) or decrease (for a strategy based on accruals). This is due to the disproportionate number of delisting firm-years in the lowest decile of these variables. Delisting firm-years are most often excluded because the researcher does not correctly inc...
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作者:Balsam, Steven; Miharjo, Setlyono
作者单位:Pennsylvania Commonwealth System of Higher Education (PCSHE); Temple University; Gadjah Mada University
摘要:Equity compensation provides incentives for executives to remain with the firm to avoid forfeiture of restricted shares and some or all of the value of stock options held. Empirically we show that the intrinsic value of unexercisable in-the-money options, the time value of unexercised options, and the value of restricted shares are inversely related to voluntary executive turnover. These findings which are most pronounced for strong performers, hold for CEOs and non-CEOs alike. While paying ex...
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作者:Clement, Michael B.; Koonce, Lisa; Lopez, Thomas J.
作者单位:University of Texas System; University of Texas Austin; University of South Carolina System; University of South Carolina Columbia
摘要:Considerable debate exists about what analyst experience measures and whether analysts learn from their experiences. Extant research has argued that once innate ability is considered, analysts' general and firm-specific experiences are not relevant to understanding their forecasting performance. We argue that measures of experience need to be expanded to also include task-specific experience. Our results reveal that analysts' forecast accuracy is associated with both their innate ability and t...
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作者:Shivakumar, Lakshmanan
作者单位:University of London; London Business School
摘要:Anilowski, Feng and Skinner (Journal of Accounting and Economics, 2006, this issue) examine the relationship between aggregate earnings guidance, aggregate earnings news and market returns. They provide evidence that changes in aggregate proportions of downward or upward earnings guidance are associated with aggregate earnings news and weakly associated with market returns. However, the study is unable to establish causality or the precise nature of the relationship between aggregate earnings ...
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作者:Drymiotes, George
作者单位:University of Houston System; University of Houston
摘要:Conventional wisdom suggests that giving monitored agents an oversight role may blunt the effectiveness of the monitoring process. In contrast, I show that less independent boards can sometimes be more effective at monitoring. Fully independent boards have incentives to shirk monitoring ex post, after the agents' productive inputs are sunk, if the boards cannot commit ex ante to monitoring. However, boards with inside directors may have incentives to monitor the agents ex post. The demand for ...
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作者:Ali, Ashiq; Chen, Tai-Yuan; Radhakrishnan, Suresh
作者单位:University of Texas System; University of Texas Dallas; Hong Kong University of Science & Technology
摘要:Compared to non-family firms, family firms face less severe agency problems due to the separation of ownership and management, but more severe agency problems that arise between controlling and non-controlling shareholders. These characteristics of family firms affect their corporate disclosure practices. For S&P 500 firms, we show that family firms report better quality earnings, are more likely to warn for a given magnitude of bad news, but make fewer disclosures about their corporate govern...
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作者:Suijs, Jeroen
作者单位:Erasmus University Rotterdam - Excl Erasmus MC; Erasmus University Rotterdam
摘要:A firm may prefer not to disclose its private information if it is uncertain of investor response. in the setting under consideration, a firm needs to acquire capital from an investor. The investor can choose to invest in the firm, the risk free asset or in some alternative risky investment opportunity. It is shown that in a partial disclosure equilibrium, the firm discloses average information and withholds bad and good information. Disclosure of average information arises to attract the inve...
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作者:Karuna, Christo
作者单位:University of California System; University of California Irvine
摘要:While some studies suggest that industry product market competition can substitute for managerial incentives. other studies suggest a complementary relation. The underlying assumption behind these studies is that competition can be uni-dimensionally proxied for by industry concentration. However, recent studies suggest that competition can reflect several dimensions: product substitutability, market size, and entry costs, given the level of industry concentration. Using these determinants of c...
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作者:Ashbaugh-Skaife, Hollis; Collins, Daniel W.; Kinney, William R., Jr.
作者单位:University of Iowa; University of Wisconsin System; University of Wisconsin Madison; University of Texas System; University of Texas Austin
摘要:We use internal control deficiency (ICD) disclosures prior to mandated internal control audits to investigate economic factors that expose firms to control failures and managements' incentives to discover and report control problems. We find that, relative to non-disclosers, firms disclosing 1CDs have more complex operations, recent organizational changes, greater accounting risk, more auditor resignations and have fewer resources available for internal control. Regarding incentives to discove...