Voluntary disclosure of information when firms are uncertain of investor response

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Suijs, Jeroen
• 署名单位: Erasmus University Rotterdam - Excl Erasmus MC; Erasmus University Rotterdam
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF ACCOUNTING & ECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0165-4101
• DOI: 10.1016/j.jacceco.2006.10.002
• 发表日期: 2007
• 关键词: discretionary disclosure; essays

摘要

A firm may prefer not to disclose its private information if it is uncertain of investor response. in the setting under consideration, a firm needs to acquire capital from an investor. The investor can choose to invest in the firm, the risk free asset or in some alternative risky investment opportunity. It is shown that in a partial disclosure equilibrium, the firm discloses average information and withholds bad and good information. Disclosure of average information arises to attract the investor's capital away from the risk free asset. (c) 2006 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.