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作者：Hayes, Rachel M.
作者单位：Utah System of Higher Education; University of Utah
摘要：The study by deHaan et al. (2015) provides an empirical analysis of the effects of revolving door incentives at the SEC. Using a sample of SEC lawyers prosecuting civil cases of accounting misrepresentation, the authors examine how three measures of enforcement outcomes are related to the lawyers' career paths. I discuss specific elements of the study's research design, including the measurement of the study's two key elements, revolving door incentives and regulatory oversight, and comment on...
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作者：Reed, Adam V.
作者单位：University of North Carolina; University of North Carolina Chapel Hill
摘要：One key challenge for the short selling literature is to identify the incremental contribution of various measures of short sale constraints. Although variables such as loan fee, loan supply and short interest are determined simultaneously in the market for borrowing stock, new incremental information may be found in each variable examined. Papers such as Beneish et al. (2015) attempt to disentangle the effect of one particular variable, and attempt to shed light on the parallel challenge face...
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作者：Ali, Ashiq; Zhang, Weining
作者单位：University of Texas System; University of Texas Dallas
摘要：This study examines changes in CEOs' incentive to manage their firms' reported earnings during their tenure. Earnings overstatement is greater in the early years than in the later years of CEOs' service, and this relation is less pronounced for firms with greater external and internal monitoring. These results suggest that new CEOs try to favorably influence the market's perception of their ability in their early years of service, when the market is more uncertain. Also, consistent with the ho...
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作者：Burgstahler, David; Chuk, Elizabeth
作者单位：University of Washington; University of Washington Seattle; University of Southern California
摘要：Earnings distributions commonly exhibit statistically significant discontinuities at zero earnings, which are widely interpreted as evidence of earnings management to avoid a loss. In contrast, Durtschi and Easton (2005, 2009, hereafter DE) assert that discontinuities are instead explained by some combination of prior researchers' choice(s) of scaling and sample selection as well as a scaling-related effect due to a systematic relation between the sign of earnings and market prices. Resolution...
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作者：Taylor, Daniel J.; Verrecchia, Robert E.
作者单位：University of Pennsylvania
摘要：We extend a standard, rational expectation model of trade to incorporate the possibility of individual investors delegating their trades to an informed financial intermediary. In the presence of delegated trade, we show that a firm's risk premium is a function of both the firm's exposure to a common risk factor and idiosyncratic characteristics of the firm's information environment. We show that even in a large economy, priced risks can manifest in the form of both idiosyncratic firm character...
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作者：Devos, Erik; Elliott, William B.; Warr, Richard S.
作者单位：University of Texas System; University of Texas El Paso; University System of Ohio; John Carroll University; North Carolina State University
摘要：Decades of research confirm that, on average, stock split announcements generate positive abnormal returns. In our sample, 80% of CEO stock option grants are timed to occur on or before the split announcement date. With the average market-adjusted announcement return of 3.1%, awarding the grant before the split announcement results in an average gain per CEO-grant of $451,748. We find additional evidence consistent with timing of CEO stock trading around the split announcement. In the case of ...
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作者：Bloomfield, Matthew J.; Bloomfield, Robert
作者单位：University of Chicago; Cornell University
摘要：Taylor and Verrecchia (2015) show that idiosyncratic risk can be priced in efficient but imperfectly competitive equity markets. We discuss how the model is structured, how it might apply to the pricing of financial reporting quality, and how empiricists might test its predictions. (C) 2015 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
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作者：Ghosh, Aloke (Al); Tang, Charles Y.
作者单位：City University of New York (CUNY) System; Baruch College (CUNY); Pace University
摘要：We analyze audit fees and audit risk to extract auditors' assessment of family-firm's financial reporting quality. Relative to non-family firms, we find that auditors charge family firms significantly less, and the fee difference shrinks in magnitude when family firms have high audit risk. Using constructs for audit risk and audit effort, we show that family firms have lower audit risk, and that their auditors work less to provide assurance. Our findings suggest that superior reporting quality...
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作者：Gao, Huasheng; Luo, Juan; Tang, Tilan
作者单位：Nanyang Technological University; University of Adelaide; Clemson University
摘要：We find that companies dramatically raise their incumbent executives' pay, especially equity-based pay, after losing executives to other firms. The pay raise is larger when incumbent executives have greater employment mobility in the labor market, when companies lose senior executives, and when job-hopping executives receive favorable job offers in their new firms. A company's subsequent pay raise to incumbent executives after losing an executive diminishes its deficiency in executive compensa...
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作者：Healy, Paul M.
作者单位：Harvard University
摘要：Billings et al. (2015) hypothesize that managers issue guidance in response to increased market uncertainty about their firm's prospects, and that guidance is an effective way of reducing increased uncertainty. They test these hypotheses by examining changes in implied option volatility for a sample of firms that issue guidance in conjunction with earnings announcements. The findings support their hypotheses, but there are challenges in their interpretation given prior evidence that predictabl...
