CEO opportunism?: Option grants and stock trades around stock splits

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Devos, Erik; Elliott, William B.; Warr, Richard S.
• 署名单位: University of Texas System; University of Texas El Paso; University System of Ohio; John Carroll University; North Carolina State University
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF ACCOUNTING & ECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0165-4101
• DOI: 10.1016/j.jacceco.2015.02.004
• 发表日期: 2015
• 关键词: CORPORATE GOVERNANCE; voluntary disclosures; awards; prices; signal; dates

摘要

Decades of research confirm that, on average, stock split announcements generate positive abnormal returns. In our sample, 80% of CEO stock option grants are timed to occur on or before the split announcement date. With the average market-adjusted announcement return of 3.1%, awarding the grant before the split announcement results in an average gain per CEO-grant of $451,748. We find additional evidence consistent with timing of CEO stock trading around the split announcement. In the case of CEO stock sales, about two-thirds occur after the split announcement, resulting in an average gain of $345,613. (C) 2015 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.