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作者:Koh, Ping-Sheng; Reeb, David M.
作者单位:Hong Kong University of Science & Technology; National University of Singapore
摘要:We investigate whether missing R&D expenditures in financial statements indicates a lack of innovation activity. Patent records reveal that 10.5% of missing R&D firms file and receive patents, which is 14 times greater than zero R&D firms. Pseudo-Blank R&D firms (missing R&D firms with patent activity) demonstrate patent filings analogous to the bottom 90-95% of the positive R&D population. Multivariate difference-in-differences tests indicate that Pseudo-Blank R&D firms are more likely to rep...
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作者:Billings, Mary Brooke; Jennings, Robert; Lev, Baruch
作者单位:New York University; Indiana University System; Indiana University Bloomington
摘要:In contrast to theoretical and empirical evidence linking disclosure to information environment benefits, recent research concludes that guidance increases volatility, but leaves open the question of whether volatility plays a role in prompting the issuance of guidance. Consistent with the notion that managers react to rising volatility by providing guidance, we document a link between abnormal run-ups in volatility and the decision to issue a forecast after controlling for the market's abilit...
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作者:Armstrong, Christopher S.; Blouin, Jennifer L.; Jagolinzer, Alan D.; Larcker, David F.
作者单位:University of Pennsylvania; University of Colorado System; University of Colorado Boulder; Stanford University
摘要:We examine the link between corporate governance, managerial incentives, and corporate tax avoidance. Similar to other investment opportunities that involve risky expected cash flows, unresolved agency problems may lead managers to engage in more or less corporate tax avoidance than shareholders would otherwise prefer. Consistent with the mixed results reported in prior studies, we find no relation between various corporate governance mechanisms and tax avoidance at the conditional mean and me...
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作者:Bertomeu, Jeremy; Magee, Robert P.
作者单位:City University of New York (CUNY) System; Baruch College (CUNY); Northwestern University
摘要:This paper examines the demand for disclosure rules by informed managers interested in increasing the market price of their firms. Within a model of political influence, a majority of managers chooses disclosure rules with which all firms must comply. In equilibrium, disclosure rules are asymmetric with greater levels of disclosure over adverse events. This asymmetry is positively associated with the informativeness of the measurement and increasing in the level of verifiability and ex-ante un...
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作者:Haggard, K. Stephen; Howe, John S.; Lynch, Andrew A.
作者单位:Missouri State University; University of Missouri System; University of Missouri Columbia; State University of New York (SUNY) System; Binghamton University, SUNY
摘要:We examine the information environments of firms following large, non-recurring charges (baths). We test competing hypotheses about the consequences of a bath a bath either improves the information environment (the transparency hypothesis) or degrades it (the opacity hypothesis). Difference-in-differences analysis suggests that after a bath (I) earnings become smoother, (2) firm-level information asymmetry decreases, and (3) stock returns become more responsive to unexpected earnings. We inter...
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作者:Marinovic, Ivan; Sridhar, Sri S.
作者单位:Stanford University; Northwestern University
摘要:This paper studies two disclosure regimes when a firm with superior private information must rely on a strategic certifier to disclose credibly its prospects. In the ex ante (ex post) disclosure regime, the firm must decide on whether to hire the certifier before (after) observing the certifier's noisy assessment. Endogenously determined certification fees can actually cause the disclosure probability to decrease in disclosure precision. In the ex ante regime, favorable disclosures are more in...
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作者:deHaan, Ed; Kedia, Simi; Koh, Kevin; Rajgopal, Shivaram
作者单位:Stanford University; Nanyang Technological University; Rutgers University System; Rutgers University New Brunswick; Columbia University
摘要:We investigate the consequences of the revolving door for trial lawyers at the SEC's enforcement division. If future job opportunities motivate SEC lawyers to develop and/or showcase their enforcement expertise, then the revolving door phenomenon will promote more aggressive regulatory activity (the human capital hypothesis). In contrast, SEC lawyers can relax enforcement efforts in order to develop networking skills and/or curry favor with prospective employers at private law firms (the rent ...