Discussion of On Guidance and Volatility

• 成果类型: Editorial Material
• 署名作者: Healy, Paul M.
• 署名单位: Harvard University
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF ACCOUNTING & ECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0165-4101
• DOI: 10.1016/j.jacceco.2015.07.009
• 发表日期: 2015
• 关键词: disclosure

摘要

Billings et al. (2015) hypothesize that managers issue guidance in response to increased market uncertainty about their firm's prospects, and that guidance is an effective way of reducing increased uncertainty. They test these hypotheses by examining changes in implied option volatility for a sample of firms that issue guidance in conjunction with earnings announcements. The findings support their hypotheses, but there are challenges in their interpretation given prior evidence that predictable information events cause similar patterns in implied option volatility. (C) 2015 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.