CEO tenure and earnings management

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Ali, Ashiq; Zhang, Weining
• 署名单位: University of Texas System; University of Texas Dallas
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF ACCOUNTING & ECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0165-4101
• DOI: 10.1016/j.jacceco.2014.11.004
• 发表日期: 2015
• 关键词: CORPORATE GOVERNANCE; information-content; nonaudit services; ANALYST COVERAGE; career concerns; HORIZON PROBLEM; incentives; reputation; INVESTMENT; accruals

摘要

This study examines changes in CEOs' incentive to manage their firms' reported earnings during their tenure. Earnings overstatement is greater in the early years than in the later years of CEOs' service, and this relation is less pronounced for firms with greater external and internal monitoring. These results suggest that new CEOs try to favorably influence the market's perception of their ability in their early years of service, when the market is more uncertain. Also, consistent with the horizon problem, earnings overstatement is greater in the CEOs' final year, but this result obtains only after controlling for earnings overstatement in their early years of service. (C) 2014 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.