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作者:Anantharaman, Divya; Henderson, Darren
作者单位:Rutgers University System; Rutgers University Newark; Rutgers University New Brunswick; Wilfrid Laurier University
摘要:In the setting of defined-benefit pension liabilities, we hypothesize that equity and debt investors value these liabilities differently. As expected, we find that investors' valuations of equity more closely align with a going concern perspective that emphasizes the longterm funding needs of pension plans. In contrast, as expected, we find that investors' pricing of short-term and unsecured debt more closely aligns with a settlement perspective that emphasizes pension termination costs. For b...
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作者:Beardsley, Erik L.; Imdieke, Andrew J.; Omer, Thomas C.
作者单位:University of Notre Dame; University of Nebraska System; University of Nebraska Lincoln
摘要:The effect of auditor-provided non-audit services (NAS) on audit quality has been a long-standing debate among academics, practitioners, and regulators. Academic research on this topic primarily examines client-level data to evaluate the tradeoff between independence and knowledge spillover related to providing NAS to a particular client.1 However, prior studies have not examined whether an emphasis on providing NAS to audit clients more generally (i.e., not just to a specific client) can dist...
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作者:Balakrishnan, Karthik; De George, Emmanuel T.; Ertan, Aytekin; Scobie, Hannah
作者单位:Rice University; University of Miami; University of London; London Business School; University of London
摘要:We study the economic consequences of mandates that require bank auditors to report to bank regulators. Based on survey responses from the European Central Bank, all 28 national bank regulators within the European Union, and a review of national banking regulations, we create a novel dataset on these mandates. Exploiting the cross-sectional and time-series variation in these mandates, we find evidence that auditor reporting to bank regulators reduces bank riskiness, as measured by counterparty...
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作者:Bradley, Sebastien; Robinson, Leslie; Ruf, Martin
作者单位:Drexel University; Dartmouth College; Eberhard Karls University of Tubingen
摘要:Intellectual property (IP) box regimes reward ownership of successful technology by imposing lower tax rates on income derived from IP relative to other sources of business income. Coupled with explicit provisions regarding the eligibility of acquired IP, IP boxes may affect merger and acquisition (M&A) incentives through multiple channels. Applying panel difference-in-differences, triple-differencing, and event study methods, we examine the effects of these modified incentives on the volume o...
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作者:Balakrishnan, Karthik; Shivakumar, Lakshmanan; Taori, Peeyush
作者单位:Rice University; University of London; London Business School; University of Hong Kong
摘要:We explore a large sample of analysts' estimates of the cost of equity capital (CoE) to evaluate their usefulness as expected return proxies (ERP). We find that the CoE estimates are significantly related to a firm's beta, size, book-to-market ratio, leverage, and idio-syncratic volatility but not other risk proxies. Even after controlling for the popular return predictors, the CoE estimates incrementally predict future stock returns. This predictive ability is better explained as the CoE esti...
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作者:Bushman, Robert; Gao, Janet; Martin, Xiumin; Pacelli, Joseph
作者单位:University of North Carolina; University of North Carolina Chapel Hill; Indiana University System; Indiana University Bloomington; Washington University (WUSTL)
摘要:We investigate the extent to which loan officers generate independent, individual effects on the design and performance of syndicated loans. We construct a large database containing the identities of loan officers involved in structuring syndicated loan deals, allowing us to systematically disentangle borrower, bank, and loan officer fixed effects. We find that loan officers have significant influence on interest spreads, loan covenant design, and loan performance. Inclusion of borrower fixed ...
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作者:Kim, Jinhwan; Valentine, Kristen
作者单位:Stanford University; University System of Georgia; University of Georgia
摘要:We investigate the effect of patent disclosures on corporate innovation. Using the American Inventor's Protection Act (AIPA) as a shock that increased patent disclosures, we find an increase in innovation for firms whose rivals reveal more information after the AIPA and a decrease in innovation for firms whose own disclosures are divulged to competitors as a result of the law. These findings suggest patent disclosures generate both spillover benefits and proprietary costs. Our findings provide...
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作者:Heater, John C.; Nallareddy, Suresh; Venkatachalam, Mohan
作者单位:Duke University
摘要:Extant literature documents that aggregate accruals positively predict future market returns and attributes this relation to either changes in discount rates or systematic earnings management. We offer an alternative explanation: aggregate merger and acquisition (M&A) activity drives this relation. M&A activity affects the magnitude of accruals, which in turn drives the market return predictability of aggregate accruals. We find that the ability of both aggregate accruals and discretionary agg...
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作者:Carter, Mary Ellen; Choi, Jen; Sedatole, Karen L.
作者单位:Boston College; Emory University
摘要:We examine how supplier industry competition affects CEO incentive intensity in pro-curing firms. Using Bureau of Economic Analysis data to compute a weighted supplier industry competition measure, we predict and find that higher supplier competition is associated with stronger CEO pay-for-performance incentive intensity. This effect is in-cremental to that of the firm's own industry competition previously documented and is robust to alternative measures of supplier competition and to exogenou...
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作者:Bloomfield, Matthew; Gipper, Brandon; Kepler, John D.; Tsui, David
作者单位:University of Pennsylvania; Stanford University; University of Southern California
摘要:Executive bonus plans often incorporate performance measures that exclude particular costsda practice we refer to as cost shielding. We predict that boards use cost shielding to mitigate underinvestment and insulate new managers from the costs of prior execu-tives' decisions. We find evidence that boards use cost shielding to deter underinvestment in intangibles and encourage managers to take advantage of growth opportunities. We also find that cost shielding tends to be elevated for newly-hir...