The influence of loan officers on loan contract design and performance

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Bushman, Robert; Gao, Janet; Martin, Xiumin; Pacelli, Joseph
• 署名单位: University of North Carolina; University of North Carolina Chapel Hill; Indiana University System; Indiana University Bloomington; Washington University (WUSTL)
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF ACCOUNTING & ECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0165-4101
• DOI: 10.1016/j.jacceco.2020.101384
• 发表日期: 2021
• 关键词: information-content; covenants; incentives; RENEGOTIATION; determinants; management; reputation; maturity; terms; style

摘要

We investigate the extent to which loan officers generate independent, individual effects on the design and performance of syndicated loans. We construct a large database containing the identities of loan officers involved in structuring syndicated loan deals, allowing us to systematically disentangle borrower, bank, and loan officer fixed effects. We find that loan officers have significant influence on interest spreads, loan covenant design, and loan performance. Inclusion of borrower fixed effects increases our power to rule out the alternative that loan officer fixed effects reflect the matching of officerds to borrowers based on time-invariant borrower characteristics. We document heterogeneity in loan officers' influence across loan contract terms, with loan officers exerting stronger influence over covenant package design than over interest spreads, but marginal influence on loan maturity. Lead officers have greater influence than participant officers over covenant package design and loan performance, but less robust differential influence on interest spreads. 0 2020 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.