The effect of supplier industry competition on pay-for-performance incentive intensity

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Carter, Mary Ellen; Choi, Jen; Sedatole, Karen L.
• 署名单位: Boston College; Emory University
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF ACCOUNTING & ECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0165-4101
• DOI: 10.1016/j.jacceco.2021.101389
• 发表日期: 2021
• 关键词: product market competition; ceo cash compensation; executive-compensation; capital structure; SYSTEMATIC-RISK; earnings; IMPACT; cost; sensitivity; governance

摘要

We examine how supplier industry competition affects CEO incentive intensity in pro-curing firms. Using Bureau of Economic Analysis data to compute a weighted supplier industry competition measure, we predict and find that higher supplier competition is associated with stronger CEO pay-for-performance incentive intensity. This effect is in-cremental to that of the firm's own industry competition previously documented and is robust to alternative measures of supplier competition and to exogenous shocks to competition. Importantly, we show that performance risk and product margin act as mediating variables in the relation between supplier competition and CEO incentive in-tensity providing support for the theory underpinning our finding. We document that CEO compensation contracts are used as a mechanism to exploit the market dynamics of up-stream industries to a firm's benefit. Our findings are economically important as suppliers provide, on average, 45 percent of the value delivered by procuring firms to the market (BEA, 2016). (c) 2021 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.