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作者：Armstrong, Christopher; Blackburne, Terrence; Quinn, Phillip
作者单位：University of Pennsylvania; Oregon State University; University of Washington; University of Washington Seattle
摘要：Little is known about why CEOs voluntarily purchase shares of their firm other than to earn direct profits. Since CEOs are risk-averse, undiversified, and face litigation costs from trading on private information, direct profits are unlikely to be the sole motive-especially since many purchases are ultimately unprofitable. We find that CEOs who have recently purchased shares are less likely to be terminated following poor performance and that this relation varies predictably with (i) their cos...
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作者：Versano, Tsahi
作者单位：Tel Aviv University
摘要：Most information that public firms are required to disclose is relatively hard (e.g., historical information), whereas the disclosure of relevant information that is softer in nature (e.g., forward-looking information) is typically left to firms' discretion. The lack of a mandatory requirement to disclose soft information has been at the heart of a number of on-going accounting debates. This study shows that while mandating disclosure increases the fre-quency of disclosure, it results in a red...
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作者：Bernard, Darren; Kaya, Devrimi; Wertz, John
作者单位：University of Washington; University of Washington Seattle; Ruhr University Bochum
摘要：Little explains firms' capital structure decisions better than peer firms' capital structure decisions. Empirical work suggests that such ?mimicking? arises not only because firms share exposure to institutional environments, industry conditions, and other common factors, but also because financing decisions are direct functions of peers? decisions (e.g., Leary and Roberts, 2014; Frank and Goyal, 2009). Possible reasons for mimicking range from agency and reputation incentives (e.g., Scharfste...
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作者：DeHaan, Ed; Song, Yang; Xie, Chloe; Zhu, Christina
作者单位：University of Washington; University of Washington Seattle; Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT); University of Pennsylvania
摘要：Mutual funds hold 32% of the U.S. equity market and comprise 58% of retirement savings, yet retail investors consistently make poor choices when selecting funds. Theory suggests poor choices are partially due to fund managers creating unnecessarily complex disclo-sures and fee structures to keep investors uninformed and obfuscate poor performance. An empirical challenge in investigating this strategic obfuscation theory is isolating manipulated complexity from complexity arising from inherent ...
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作者：Amel-Zadeh, Amir; Barth, Mary E.
作者单位：University of Oxford; Stanford University
摘要：We discuss Economic Consequences of Mandatory Auditor Reporting to Bank Regulators by Balakrishnan, De George, Ertan, and Scobie (BDES, in this issue). BDES concludes that a key benefit of mandatory auditor reporting to bank regulators is reduced bank risk, and its costs include reduced profitability from less overall and less risky lending, and higher audit costs. BDES also provides evidence on the channels through which mandatory auditor reporting links to reduced bank risk. We scrutinize BD...
