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作者：Tergiman, Chloe; Villeval, Marie Claire
作者单位：Pennsylvania Commonwealth System of Higher Education (PCSHE); Pennsylvania State University; Pennsylvania State University - University Park; Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS); Ecole Normale Superieure de Lyon (ENS de LYON); Universite Claude Bernard Lyon 1; Universite Jean Monnet; Universite Lyon 2; CNRS - Institute for Humanities & Social Sciences (INSHS); IZA Institute Labor Economics
摘要：In a finitely repeated game with asymmetric information, we experimentally study how individuals adapt the nature of their lies when settings allow for reputation building. Although some lies can be detected ex post by the uninformed party, others remain deniable. We find that traditional market mechanisms, such as reputation, generate strong changes in the way people lie and lead to strategies in which individuals can maintain plausible deniability; people simply hide their lies better by sub...
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作者：Jin, Shuang; Wang, Wei; Zhang, Zilong
作者单位：Hong Kong University of Science & Technology; Queens University - Canada; Zhejiang University
摘要：We study the effects of implicit government guarantee (IGG) on Chinese stateowned enterprises (SOEs). We find that SOEs reduce their investments by 2.4% of book assets, on average, relative to matched non-SOEs after the first SOE default in China's onshore bond markets in 2015. The investment reduction concentrates among SOEs that are financially constrained, yet SOEs financed by large state banks are hardly affected. Bondholders require more stringent default protection in newly issued SOE bo...
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作者：Fainmesser, Itay P.; Galeotti, Andrea; Momot, Ruslan
作者单位：Johns Hopkins University; Johns Hopkins University; University of London; London Business School; University of Michigan System; University of Michigan; Northwestern University
摘要：We study the incentives of a digital business to collect and protect users' data. The users' data the business collects improve the service it provides to consumers, but they may also be accessed, at a cost, by strategic third parties in a way that harms users, imposing endogenous users' privacy costs. We characterize howthe revenuemodel of the business shapes its optimal data strategy: collection and protection of users' data. A business with a more data-driven revenue model will collect more...
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作者：Boczon, Marta; Wilson, Alistair J.
作者单位：Copenhagen Business School; Pennsylvania Commonwealth System of Higher Education (PCSHE); University of Pittsburgh
摘要：We analyze the design of a randomization procedure in a field setting with high stakes and substantial public interest: matching sports teams in the Union of European Football Association Champions League. While striving for fairness in the chosen lottery- giving teams similar distributions over potential partners-the designers seek to balance two conflicting forces: (i) imposing a series of combinatorially complex constraints on the feasible matches; and (ii) designing an easy-to-understand a...
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作者：Iyengar, Garud; Saleh, Fahad; Sethuraman, Jay; Wang, Wenjun
作者单位：Columbia University; Wake Forest University
摘要：We construct an economic framework for understanding the incentives of the participants of a permissioned blockchain for supply chains and other related industries. Our study aims to determine whether adoption of blockchain is socially beneficial and whether such adoption arises in equilibrium. We find that blockchain reduces information asymmetry for consumers, thereby enhancing consumer welfare. Consumer welfare gains can be suffi-ciently large that blockchain adoption is socially beneficial...
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作者：Chen, Ye; Ryzhov, Ilya O.
作者单位：Virginia Commonwealth University; University System of Maryland; University of Maryland College Park
摘要：In the ranking and selection problem, a sampling budget is allocated among a finite number of designs with the goal of efficiently identifying the best. Allocations of this budget may be static (with no dependence on the random values of the samples) or adaptive (decisions are made based on the results of previous decisions). A popular methodological strategy in the simulation literature is to first characterize optimal static allocations by using large deviations theory to derive a set of opt...
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作者：Drakopoulos, Kimon; Makhdoumi, Ali
作者单位：University of Southern California; Duke University
摘要：We consider the problem of a seller of data who sells information to a buyer regarding an unknown (to both parties) state of the world. Traditionally, the literature explores one-round strategies for selling information because of the seller's holdup problem: once a portion of the data set is released, the buyer's estimate improves, and as a result, the value of the remaining data set drops. In this paper, we show that this intuition is true when the buyer's objective is to improve the precisi...
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作者：Mai, Yunke; Hu, Bin
作者单位：University of Kentucky; University of Texas System; University of Texas Dallas
摘要：We consider the optimal operating policies of a free-to-play multiplayer game with a premium subscription to maximize its lifetime operating profit. Accounting for social comparisons between free and premium players, we model the game attracting or losing players with a hybrid of the Bass diffusion model and the replicator equation in evolutionary game theory. Leveraging optimal control theory, we characterize optimal dynamic pricing and advertising policies and show that the developer should ...
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作者：Corgnet, Brice; Deck, Cary; DeSantis, Mark; Hampton, Kyle; Kimbrough, Erik O.
作者单位：Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS); Ecole Normale Superieure de Lyon (ENS de LYON); Universite Claude Bernard Lyon 1; Universite Jean Monnet; Universite Lyon 2; emlyon business school; University of Alabama System; University of Alabama Tuscaloosa; Chapman University System; Chapman University; Chapman University System; Chapman University; Chapman University System; Chapman University
摘要：We attempt to replicate a seminal paper that offered support for the rational expectations hypothesis and reported evidence that markets with certain features aggregate dispersed information. The original results are based on only a few observations, and our attempt to replicate the key findings with an appropriately powered experiment largely fails. The resulting poststudy probability that market performance is better described by rational expectations than the prior information (Walrasian) m...
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作者：Hollstein, Fabian; Prokopczukb, Marcel
作者单位：Saarland University; Leibniz University Hannover; University of Reading
摘要：We analyze the relation between time-series predictability and factor investing. We use a large set of financial, macroeconomic, and technical variables to time-series-manage the market portfolio. A combination of the out-of-sample market excess return forecasts of all variables yields a managed market portfolio that generates alphas relative to cross-sectional factor models that exceed 5% per annum. More broadly, the relation between time-series evaluation measures and (multifactor) alphas is...
