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作者：Wang, Kemin; Yu, Xiaoyun; Zhang, Bohui
作者单位：Fudan University; Shanghai Jiao Tong University; The Chinese University of Hong Kong, Shenzhen; The Chinese University of Hong Kong, Shenzhen; The Chinese University of Hong Kong, Shenzhen
摘要：We show that firms strategically alter their disclosures when investors' access to information via search engines is interrupted. We conduct a textual analysis and exploit an exogenous event-Google's 2010 surprising withdrawal from mainland China, which significantly hampered domestic investors' ability to search for foreign information but did not affect their cost to access domestic information. Following Google's exit, Chinese firms' announcements on foreign transactions become more bullish...
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作者：Laudenbach, Christine; Ungeheuer, Michael; Weber, Martin
作者单位：Aalto University; University of Mannheim; Centre for Economic Policy Research - UK
摘要：We experimentally study how presentation formats for return distributions affect investors' diversification choices. We find that sampling returns alleviates correlation neglect and constitutes an effective way to improve financial decisions. When participants get a description of the probabilities for outcomes of the joint return distribution, we confirm the findings of others that investors neglect the correlation between assets in their diversification choices. However, when participants sa...
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作者：Yoganarasimhan, Hema; Barzegary, Ebrahim; Pani, Abhishek
作者单位：University of Washington; University of Washington Seattle
摘要：Free trial promotions are a commonly used customer acquisition strategy in the Software as a Service industry. We use data from a large-scale field experiment to study the effect of trial length on customer-level outcomes. We find that, on average, shorter trial lengths (surprisingly) maximize customer acquisition, retention, and profitability. Next, we examine the mechanism through which trial length affects conversions and rule out the demand cannibalization theory, find support for the cons...
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作者：Sousa, Jose De; Hollard, Guillaume
作者单位：Universite Paris Saclay; Institut Polytechnique de Paris; Ecole Polytechnique; Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS); Institut Polytechnique de Paris; Ecole Polytechnique
摘要：We document that women compete worse against men in field tournaments in over 150 countries and across all ages. Our field setting is the game of chess and we benefit from a large and rich data set to investigate the robustness and heterogeneity of our uncovered gender differences in competition. We find a macro gender gap in every country: there are fewer female than male players, especially at the top, and women have lower average rankings. Moreover, comparing millions of individual games, w...
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作者：Walker, Matthew J.; Katok, Elena; Shachat, Jason
作者单位：Newcastle University - UK; University of Texas System; University of Texas Dallas; Durham University; Wuhan University
摘要：In complex procurement projects, it is difficult to write enforceable contracts that condition price upon quality. Supplier nonperformance becomes an acute risk, particularly when there is intense competition for the contract. An established incentive mechanism used to mitigate the problem of supplier nonperformance is retainage, in which the buyer sets aside a portion of the purchase price. After project completion, the buyer determines the amount of retainage that is released to the seller, ...
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作者：Laussel, Didier; Long, Ngo Van; Resende, Joana
作者单位：Aix-Marseille Universite; McGill University; Australian National University; Universidade do Porto
摘要：We consider a nondurable good monopolist that collects data on its customers in order to profile them and subsequently practice price discrimination on returning cus-tomers. The monopolist's price discrimination scheme is leaky in the sense that an endogenous fraction of consumers choose to incur a privacy cost to conceal their identity when they return in the following periods. We characterize the Markov perfect equili-brium of the game under two alternative customer profiling regimes: full i...
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作者：Crane, Alan; Crotty, Kevin; Umar, Tarik
作者单位：Rice University
摘要：Hedge funds actively acquire publicly available financial disclosures. Funds acquiring such information subsequently earn 1.5% higher annualized abnormal returns than nonacquirers. Trades by the same fund in the same quarter are more profitable when accompanied by public information acquisition. Acquiring public filings is relatively less profitable when macrouncertainty is high. Funds employ a wide range of strategies for acquiring public filings. Those that systematically scrape large volume...
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作者：Desai, Hemang; Lam, Pauline; Li, Bin; Rajgopal, Shiva
作者单位：Southern Methodist University; New York University; University of Houston System; University of Houston; Columbia University
摘要：We study carbon-reduction pledges of publicly traded U.S. oil exploration and production (E&P) companies. Of the 69 firms in the sample, 18 have committed to net-zero carbon targets, 14 have announced significant emissions cuts, whereas the remaining 37 firms have not announced any formal commitment to reduce emissions. We find that a firm's energy production and ownership by BlackRock is positively associated with its decision to announce a net-zero pledge or significant emission cuts. E&P fi...
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作者：Liu, Yue; Luo, Rong
作者单位：Central University of Finance & Economics; Renmin University of China
摘要：Although the literature on network effects has focused on single-network firms, many industries feature multinetwork firms that play more complex dynamic pricing games. In this paper, we estimate the network effect at the smartphone operating system (OS) level and study multi-OS telecommunication carriers' dynamic pricing strategies in an oligopolistic setting, using data on the U.S. smartphone industry. We find a positive OS network effect. Counterfactual analysis indicates that if the carrie...
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作者：Malmendier, Ulrike; Pezone, Vincenzo; Zheng, Hui
作者单位：University of California System; University of California Berkeley; Tilburg University
摘要：Much of the evidence on managerial biases in corporate finance focuses on the CEO and, in particular, CEO overconfidence. This singular focus can lead to misattribution as it ignores the roles of other managers who are responsible for a given corporate outcome. We evaluate the influence of the CFO and other C-suite executives as compared with the CEO. Mirroring the widely used Longholder CEO measure of CEO overconfidence, we construct Longholder CFO and Longholder Other measures. For financing...
